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Article
Mindful Debiasing: Meditation as a Tool to Address
Disability Discrimination
ELIZABETH F. EMENS
Antidiscrimination law is at a critical juncture. The law prohibits formal
and explicit systems of exclusion, but much bias nonetheless persists. New
tools are needed. This Article argues that mindfulness meditation may be a
powerful strategy in the battle against disability discrimination. This Article
sets out eight reasons that disability bias is particularly intractable. The
Article then draws on empirical, philosophical, and scholarly sources to
identify mechanisms through which mindfulness meditation can address
these dynamics. The Article concludes by presenting concrete doctrinal
implications of bringing mindfulness to bear on disability discrimination.
This Article thus contributes to the established fields of antidiscrimination
law in general and disability law in particular, as well as the emerging
domain of mindfulness and law.
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Mindful Debiasing: Meditation as a Tool for
Addressing Disability Discrimination
ELIZABETH F. EMENS *
A provocative empirical literature proposes a remarkable finding:
Meditation can reduce discriminatory bias. This growing body of research
reports similar findings across a range of dimensions of identity protected
by antidiscrimination law—including disability, as well as race, ethnicity,
and age—and axes that typically fall outside the scope of antidiscrimination
law, such as homelessness.1
If this is true, if meditation can reduce disability and other forms of
bias, then this finding is profound and important. At present, however,
these studies are new, few, and small-scale, particularly with regard to
disability discrimination, which is the focus of this Article.2 These studies
need to be expanded, improved, and replicated. It is therefore too soon to
make bold claims.
These intriguing studies nonetheless invite us to ask a series of questions
about discrimination, disability, well-being, workplace dynamics, and law.
Definitive answers are beyond the horizon at this point, but the questions are
urgent and inspire important insights.
Analysis of discrimination and antidiscrimination law typically starts
with race, at least in this country, and with sex and gender in many other
*
Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For helpful comments
and conversations, I thank Samuel Bagenstos, Emily Benfer, Mathilde Cohen, Yaron Covo, Daniel Del
Gobbo, J. Richard Emens, Jens Frankenreiter, Bert Huang, Olatunde Johnson, Kathryn Judge, Sarah
Lawsky, Ana Lenard, Karen Reitman, Russell Robinson, Clifford Rosky, Kelsey Ruescher-Enkeboll,
Sharon Salzberg, Ilan Stein, Michael Stein, Susan Sturm, Cass Sunstein, Kiana Taghavi, Karen Tani,
Kristen Underhill, Rachael Wells, and Patricia Williams, as well as participants in workshops at the
AALS Annual Meeting Section on Employment and Labor Law, the Symposium on Personhood and
Civic Engagement by People with Disabilities at Cardozo Law School, University of Massachusetts
Medical School’s Center for Mindfulness MBSR Practicum, the Mindful Lawyering Retreat, the
Columbia Law School Mindfulness and Racism Discussion Group, and my classes on Law, Justice, and
Reflect Practice and Lawyer-Leadership: Leading Self, Leading Others, Leading Change. And for
excellent research assistance, my gratitude goes to David Beizer, Ariel Blask, Molly Bodurtha, Rivky
Brandwein, Iliria Camaj, Noah Foster, Yashvi Ganeriwala, Daniel Harper, Joshua Jorgensen, Karen
Kadish, Adam Katz, Stephany Kim, Megan Liu, Brett Mead, Ian Miller, Maeghan Murphy, Andrea Metz,
Ian Miller, Julia Nelson, Charlene Ni, Yuna Park, Ravi Shah, Larissa Speak, and Rebecca Yergin.
1
See infra Part I (discussing studies of meditation and bias). On states’ lack of antidiscrimination
protections for unhoused persons, with the notable exception of Rhode Island, see Michael F. Drywa, Jr.,
Rhode Island’s Homeless Bill of Rights: How Can the New Law Provide Shelter from Employment
Discrimination?, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 716, 716–17 (2014).
2
This Article focuses specifically on disability discrimination for several reasons, including that
relatively little has been written about it and that particular synergies between disability and mindfulness
are worth examining in their own right.
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places.3 This Article instead places disability at the center. How might
meditation help reduce disability bias? And if it did so, what would that
mean for law? This Article addresses those questions.
The fields of antidiscrimination law in general and disability law in
particular demand new strategies and new tools to tackle pressing and, thus
far, insoluble problems. In recent decades, antidiscrimination-law
scholarship has been wrestling with the problems of implicit bias and other
forms of second-generation discrimination.4 Susan Sturm offered this classic
formulation:
The project of pursuing workplace equity has reached a new
stage. . . . Smoking guns—the sign on the door that “Irish need
not apply” or the rejection explained by the comment “this is
no job for a woman”—are largely things of the past. Many
employers now have formal policies prohibiting race and sex
discrimination, and procedures to enforce those policies.
Cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of
interaction have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the
frontier of much continued inequality.5
Sturm goes on to distinguish these older and newer forms of discrimination
as first-generation and second-generation discrimination, respectively,
observing that “[t]he complex and dynamic problems inherent in second
generation discrimination cases pose a serious challenge for a first
generation system that relies solely on courts (or other external governmental
institutions) to articulate and enforce specific, across-the-board rules.”6
The late Adrienne Asch vividly described problems of second-generation
disability discrimination in her writing. Reflecting on the way her blindness
shaped others’ attitudes, Asch wrote in the Ohio State Law Journal, “[t]he
ADA may prevent a local health club or public pool from turning me away if
I go to exercise or swim, but it will do nothing to help me persuade a group of
3

See, e.g., MARIE MERCAT-BRUNS, DISCRIMINATION AT WORK: COMPARING EUROPEAN, FRENCH,

AND AMERICAN LAW 146–47 (Elaine Holt trans., 2016) (stating that racial discrimination “largely served

as an antidiscrimination model in the United States for all antidiscrimination norms . . . . while sex
discrimination served as the model for antidiscrimination in Europe via the Treaty-enshrined principle
of equal pay for women and men”).
4
See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
91 (2003); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 992–94
(2006); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093 (2008); Jasmine E. Harris, Processing Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 457 (2015).
5
Sturm, supra note 4, at 459–60 (footnotes omitted).
6
Id. at 461.

2022]

MINDFUL DEBIASING

839
7

new friends that I could join them for a carefree afternoon at a lake.” Asch’s
focus here is bias beyond the reach of legal prohibition, in domains such as
friendship and intimate relations.8 But her point dovetails with the concerns
raised by Sturm and others: What, if anything, can be done about subtler forms
of bias and the ways they intersect with individual and institutional decisionmaking about disability and other features of our identities?
This question is made only more urgent by the recent upsurge in explicit
expressions of bias, which, as Sturm pointed out in her foundational article,
coexist and collaborate with second-generation discrimination.9 When
apparent public mockery of a disabled reporter does not derail a presidential
campaign,10 the research documenting pervasive implicit bias against people
with disabilities becomes even more vivid and unsettling.11
7

Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and Disability: Reflections on Social Justice
and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 395–96 (2001).
8
On the indirect ways that law shapes race and disability discrimination in intimate domains, see,
for example, SHERYLL D. CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004); Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s
Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1379–400 (2009) [hereinafter Emens,
Intimate Discrimination]. The law indirectly shapes race and disability discrimination in intimate
domains, however, through the de facto segregation of neighborhoods and schools that is the legacy of
racial redlining and other practices of racial discrimination; through the exclusions that result from the
failure to enforce laws prohibiting race and disability discrimination in public accommodations and
private housing; and through the lack of any legal requirements of basic “visitability” standards in most
jurisdictions in this country. See id. at 1380–90 (footnotes omitted).
9
See Sturm, supra note 4, at 468 (“First generation discrimination . . . often operates in tandem
with or is supplanted by subtle, interactive, and structural bias.”). On the recent upsurge, see, for example,
the uptick in hate crimes against people with disabilities, Shaun Heasley, Disability-Related Hate Crimes
up Sharply, FBI Data Shows, DISABILITY SCOOP (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2
019/11/14/disability-related-hate-crimes-up-sharply-fbi-data/27454/, as well as prominent expressions
of bias, like the remarks by then-candidate Trump referenced in the next sentence, infra text
accompanying note 10.
10
Callum Borchers, Meryl Streep Was Right. Donald Trump Did Mock a Disabled Reporter, WASH.
POST (Jan. 9, 2017, 9:25 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/09/merylstreep-was-right-donald-trump-did-mock-a-disabled-reporter/. Trump has repeatedly denied an intention
to mock, but his gestures bear a striking resemblance to the physical disability of Serge Kovaleski, a
reporter he had known for years. Id.; Jessica Taylor, 11 Times Donald Trump Looked Like He Was Done
For, NPR (Dec. 28, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/12/28/506342901/11-times-donaldtrump-looked-like-he-was-done-for.
11
See, e.g., Tessa E. S. Charlesworth & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Patterns of Implicit and Explicit
Attitudes: I. Long-Term Change and Stability From 2007 to 2016, 30 PSYCH . SCI. 174, 175, 186–88
(2019) (finding, in a sample of 4.4. million subject responses collected between 2004 and 2016, that
“[e]xplicit disability attitudes changed [from negative] toward neutrality by approximately 24%.
However, no change was observed in implicit disability attitudes (changing by approximately 2%),” and
observing “stability in implicit disability attitudes . . . for all respondents, regardless of disability status
or generational cohort”); Tessa E. S. Charlesworth & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Do Implicit Attitudes and
Beliefs Change over the Long Term?, in WHAT WORKS? EVIDENCE-BASED IDEAS TO INCREASE
DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND INCLUSION IN THE WORKPLACE 7, 12 (reporting, based on “data from nearly 6
million respondents,” that while “implicit (and explicit) attitudes/beliefs about some minority groups can
and do improve over the long term,” “some implicit attitudes (about age and disability) have remained
stagnant”); Johannes Rojahn, Kristi G. Komelasky & Michelle Man, Implicit Attitudes and Explicit
Ratings of Romantic Attraction of College Students Toward Opposite-Sex Peers with Physical
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Disability bias also presents fascinating and unique challenges, in
addition to sharing some features with racism and other forms of bias.12
Central among these is the puzzle of how widespread disability bias can
coexist with humans’ universal vulnerability to disability.13 Discrimination
is often assumed to arise from insularity.14 But 25% of the U.S. population
lives with some kind of disability, 15 and everyone else could become
disabled.16 It is therefore surprising that people with disabilities are so
frequently subjected to emotional distance rather than pervasive empathy.17
Disability is also a provocative area for study because of the gap
between law in the books and law in action.18 In this country, disability law
has reached out ahead of cultural norms, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) therefore met a substantial backlash in the courts.19 This
sweeping antidiscrimination law did not comport with widespread “common
Disabilities, 20 J. DEVELOPMENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITIES 389, 395 (2008) (finding, in an
experimental study, that participants’ explicit assessments of romantic attractiveness were unaffected by
the presence of physical disability, but observing that “[i]mplicit attitudes, on the other hand, reflected a
prejudice against disability”); Carli Friedman, Family Members of People with Disabilities’ Explicit and
Implicit Disability Attitudes, 64 REHAB. PSYCH. 203, 207 (2019) (concluding, from a study reporting on
over 180,000 participants, that “[m]ost family members of people with disabilities explicitly reported having
no negative attitudes, yet, implicitly, frequently had negative attitudes toward people with disabilities”).
12
By “bias,” I mean the stereotypes and attitudes that contribute to discrimination. And by
“discrimination,” I mean the behaviors that systematically disadvantage one group. For a nuanced
discussion of definitions, see, for example, DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG?
13 (2008). On the distinction in social psychology between stereotypes (thoughts and beliefs) and
attitudes (feelings), see, for example, Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social
Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCH. REV. 4, 6 (1995).
13
See infra Section II.D.
14
See infra notes 196–97 and accompanying text (discussing theory and doctrine based on discrete,
insular minorities).
15
Catherine A. Okoro, NaTasha D. Hollis, Alissa C. Cyrus & Shannon Griffin-Blake, Prevalence
of Disabilities and Health Care Access by Disability Status and Type Among Adults ⎯United States,
2016, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 17, 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmw
r.mm6732a3.
16
Many disabilities arise suddenly through “natural” causes or accidents, affecting one individual
or many. See, e.g., CDC: 1 in 4 US Adults Live with a Disability, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (Aug. 16, 2018), (“At some point in their lives, most people will either have a disability or
know someone who has [] one.”).
17
See supra notes 11–12.
18
See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15–21, 35–
36 (1910).
19
See, e.g., BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton
Krieger, ed., 2003) (collecting sources discussing narrow judicial constructions of the ADA following its
passage); Michael Waterstone, Backlash, Courts, and Disability Rights, 95 B.U. L. REV. 833, 844–45
(2015) (“Academics and advocates have linked many of the ADA’s shortcomings to the narrow ways
courts have interpreted the law, and have suggested that the lower courts and Supreme Court have not
been partners in creating the social change envisioned by the ADA.”); SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW
AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1 (2009) (“In all federal courts, ADA
plaintiffs lose their cases at astounding rates—the only litigants less successful than ADA employment
plaintiffs are prisoner plaintiffs, who are rarely even represented by counsel.”).
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sense” beliefs that disability is an individual personal tragedy that, in the
absence of a medical solution, seriously hinders a person’s potential for
happiness, professional success, and social integration.20 After courts
narrowed the scope of the ADA, Congress acted again—passing the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)—to reassert broad coverage for the
statute. Courts continue to struggle with the application of these laws,21 and
some recent work suggests that courts began applying the ADAAA less
faithfully in the second five years after enactment than in the first five
years.22 What is clear from the arc of disability law in this country, which
has been explored deeply elsewhere,23 is that law alone is not enough.
Attitudes to disability also need to change in order for the laws to fulfill their
purposes and for integration to be meaningful.24 Scholars, lawyers, and
activists therefore turn again and again to a most perplexing question: What
can actually change attitudes to disability?
One classic answer to the question builds on the idea of the contact
hypothesis. Drawing on the work of Gordon Allport, a sizable body of
research has developed to support the idea that contact across difference—
including disability as well as race and other categories—helps reduce
bias.25 Meta-analyses and other studies of contact show that contact under

20
See Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the ADA Amendments Act,
60 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 205, 207–08 (2012) [hereinafter Emens, Disabling Attitudes] (explaining the
“common sense” belief about disability as a belief that “disability is unfortunate, even tragic, costly for
employers and for society, to be avoided at most costs and accommodated only at a very limited cost”).
21
See, e.g., generally Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the
ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2027–28, 2071 (2013) (discussing the results of
an empirical study examining the “continuing judicial unease with disability discrimination”
demonstrated by a comparison of federal decisions before and after the enactment of the ADAAA).
22
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Explaining “Not Disabled” Cases Ten Years After the ADAAA: A Story
of Ignorance, Incompetence, and Possibly Animus, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 383, 392–93,
409, 411 (2019) (concluding that over 200 ADAAA cases were incorrectly decided from 2014 to 2018,
whereas only a handful of cases were incorrectly decided from 2009 to 2013).
23
See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 19; BAGENSTOS, supra note 19; Krieger, supra note 19; see also
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 629 (2000) (“Since people with disabilities were empowered with civil rights
absent the necessary political tools and organization for inducing a general elevation in social
consciousness, it is not entirely surprising that popular opinion about people with disabilities . . . has yet
to conform to the goals underlying passage of the ADA.”).
24
Law may play a role, directly or indirectly, in changing attitudes; the claim here is not that law
and attitudes are completely separate, but merely that, if attitudes do not change, then legal change will
not suffice. For more discussion of what may change attitudes, including law, see, for example, Elizabeth
F. Emens, Getting It: The ADA After Thirty Years, 71 SYRACUSE L. REV. 638 (2022).
25
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 261–82 (1954); See also, e.g., Cynthia L.
Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 23–29 (2000)
(applying Allport’s “contact hypothesis” to workplace settings); Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela
Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1385–87 (discussing social contact as a means
to reduce prejudice).
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the right conditions does help.26 That is, working side-by-side under
conditions of collaboration rather than competition, with institutional
support for integration, leads to reduced bias across difference.27 But that
research also finds that contact alone is not solving the problem28—and
indeed, contact may at times even exacerbate it.29
As Jasmine Harris has argued, the integration presumption and the faith
in the ameliorative power of contact rely on an assumption that more reliable
information about disability will reduce bias, discrimination, and
exclusion.30 But as the distinction in social psychology between stereotypes
(beliefs) and attitudes (feelings) highlights, the cognitive and the affective
are different relational dimensions. Both need to change—and the affective
dimension, including the aesthetic, may be the more intractable.31
Disability discrimination forces us to confront questions about the limits
of law—or, at least, of law as we typically conceive of it: as legislation and
judicial opinions. These limits require us to ask what other tools exist to
26
See, e.g., Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact
Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCH. 751, 751–52 (2006) (“With 713 independent samples from
515 studies, the meta-analysis finds that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice.”);
Jeanne A. Novak & Patricia M. Rogan, Social Integration in Employment Settings: Application of
Intergroup Contact Theory, 48 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 31, 44–45 (2010) (finding that
the “context and structure of contact between employees with disabilities and their nondisabled
coworkers predicted not only employee’s levels of social participation and feelings of social support but
also coworkers’ attitudes toward the employees with disabilities”); see also Margaret Denny, Suzanne
Denieffe & Majda Pajnkihar, Exploring Community Attitudes to People with Learning Disabilities:
Using a Micro-Neighbourhood Design, in LEARNING DISABILITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
185, 185–88, 201–02 (Carolyn S. Ryan ed., 2017) (finding that the “type and quality of contact” matter
in diminishing bias, and that “proximity to a group home does not necessarily imply neighbourly contact”).
27
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 843–44, 844 n.55 (2003) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Rational
Discrimination] (“According to the time-honored “contact hypothesis,” bringing people of different races
together to work on common projects in circumstances of relative equality can reduce prejudice and
stereotyping.”); Estlund, supra note 25, at 22–24 (“The research has yielded a broad consensus that
intergroup contact “will reduce prejudice . . . when (a) there is equality of status among the individuals
in contact, (b) they meet in a situation of cooperative interdependence, and (c) . . . there is normative
support for friendly intergroup relations.” (citations omitted)); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair
Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1101–03
(2006) (“Since the 1950s when the social contact hypothesis was first proposed, social psychologists
have distilled the conditions that contribute to a debiasing environment. People must be: (1) exposed to
disconfirming data; (2) interact with others of equal status; (3) cooperate; (4) engage in non-superficial
contact; and (5) receive clear norms in favor of equality.” (citations omitted)).
28
This is true both because the research finds that contact leads only to partial remedying of
attitudes, see, e.g., Pettrigrew & Tropp, supra note 26, at 751–52, and because contact itself is only partial
until integration is successful, which is the outcome being sought—so in the meantime, other strategies
are also necessary.
29
See Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics of Disability, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 895 (2019)
(“Contact and engagement with the aesthetics of disability . . . may trigger negative affective responses
that may stunt the very normative change sought through antidiscrimination law.”).
30
Id.; id. at 898–99.
31
Id. at 897.
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combat disability discrimination, to supplement formal legal prohibitions
and other debiasing strategies such as contact.
This Article explores the possibility that meditation could help address
the disheartening degree of disability bias and structural injustice.
Mindfulness meditation has begun to enter the legal and professional arena
for reasons independent of antidiscrimination efforts. Law firms, law
schools, and courts, as well as other mainstream institutions—ranging from
corporate workplaces to professional sports teams to schools to the
military—have begun embracing meditation as a technique for helping
individuals and communities perform at their best and recover from
challenges, to name two of the many reasons.32
Nonetheless, meditation still has a “towering PR problem,” to quote
news anchor Dan Harris.33 For some, this new application to debiasing will
make meditation no less weird or inapt for legal or professional settings. But
32
For legal sources, see, for example, Jeremy D. Fogel, FED. JUD. CTR., MINDFULNESS AND
JUDGING 2–6 (2016) (describing the benefits of mindfulness in the context of judging); Richard C.
Reuben & Kennon M. Sheldon, Can Mindfulness Help Law Students with Stress, Focus, and
Well-Being?: An Empirical Study of 1Ls at a Midwestern Law School, 48 SW. L. REV. 241, 242–43 (2019)
(finding that first-year law students who took an eight-week mindfulness training in the period leading
up to their fall exams were “less stressed, more focused, and happier heading into exams than when they
started the training in the middle of the first semester”); Rhonda V. Magee, Educating Lawyers to
Meditate?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 535, 531 (2010) (reporting that “mindfulness trainings have been
increasingly offered among continuing legal education programs for lawyers and mediators”); Susan
Wairose, Mindfulness Programs in U.S. Law Schools (Aug. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (last updated August 2018) (listing information on law school classes that involve mindfulness);
Peter H. Huang, Can Practicing Mindfulness Improve Lawyer Decision-Making, Ethics, and
Leadership?, 55 HOUSTON L. REV. 63, 78 (2017) (“Part of successful lawyering, negotiating, and living
involves the art of effective communication and positive communication, both of which entail practicing
mindfulness.”). For other kinds of institutions, see, for example, Yolanda Lau, Increasing Mindfulness
in the Workplace, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeshumanresourcescouncil/20
20/10/05/increasing-mindfulness-in-the-workplace/?sh=4db387406956 (regarding corporate workplaces);
Ian Begley, Knicks Reflect on Mindfulness Training, ESPN (March 9, 2015), https://www.espn.com/blo
g/new-york/knicks/post/_/id/61424/knicks-reflect-on-mindfulness-training (regarding sports teams);
Lauren Cassani Davis, When Mindfulness Meets the Classroom, ATLANTIC (Aug. 31, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/08/mindfulness-education-schools-meditation/402
469/ (regarding schools); Matt Richtel, The Latest in Military Strategy: Mindfulness, N.Y. TIMES (April
5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/health/military-mindfulness-training.html (regarding the
military); SAKI SANTORELLI, HEAL THY SELF: LESSONS ON MINDFULNESS IN MEDICINE 1–2 (1999)
(regarding the medical field); Barry Yeoman, Mindful Policing: The Future of Force, MINDFUL (June
14, 2017), https://www.mindful.org/mindful-policing-the-future-of-force/ (regarding the police). More
generally, see, for example, TIM RYAN, MINDFUL NATION, infra note 34, at xx (“It’s incredibly moving
to see children finding ways to become happier and better at learning, teachers discovering ways to have
a better classroom atmosphere . . . , health-care providers developing low-cost means to improve their
patients’ health . . . , our troops and police and firefighters learning to perform better and with more
awareness and intelligence, and our veterans receiving highly effective care for the stress and trauma
they brought home with them.”), and discussion and sources cited infra text accompanying notes 321–
27.
33
DAN HARRIS, 10% HAPPIER: HOW I TAMED THE VOICE IN MY HEAD, REDUCED STRESS
WITHOUT LOSING MY EDGE, AND FOUND SELF-HELP THAT ACTUALLY WORKS—A TRUE STORY, at xiv
(2014) [hereinafter HARRIS, 10% HAPPIER].
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the problem of discrimination is so intractable and significant that we need
to examine every available tool.
Congressman Tim Ryan and ABC News Anchor Dan Harris have both
argued for mindfulness meditation as the next public-health revolution.34 In
an entertaining short video, Harris says:
I believe that meditation and mindfulness are the next big
public health revolution. In the 1940s, if you told somebody
you were going running, they would have said, “Who’s
chasing you?” But then what happened next? The scientists
swooped in; they showed that physical exercise is really good
for you; and now all of us do it. And if we don’t, we feel guilty
about it. And that’s where I think we’re headed with
mindfulness and meditation. It’s [going to] join the pantheon
of no-brainers, like brushing your teeth, eating well, and taking
the meds your doctor prescribed for you.35
Imagine the societal impact if a practice that supports individual well-being
could also contribute even a small piece to the puzzle of addressing the
widespread bias, discrimination, and systemic injustice in our society.36
Despite a groundswell of important thinking and writing about the
potential for meditation to address racial bias and injustice,37 very little work
examines disability discrimination through the lens of meditation—and no

34
See, e.g., TIM RYAN, A MINDFUL NATION: HOW A SIMPLE PRACTICE CAN HELP US REDUCE
STRESS, IMPROVE PERFORMANCE, AND RECAPTURE THE AMERICAN SPIRIT, at xvii (2012) (describing
mindfulness as a quiet, peaceful “revolution, being led by ordinary citizens”); See also 60 Minutes:
Mindfulness (CBS Television Broadcast Dec. 14, 2014) (interviewing Congressman Ryan).
35
Happify, Why Mindfulness Is a Superpower: An Animation, YOUTUBE (Dec. 7, 2015), https://w
ww.youtube.com/watch?v=w6T02g5hnT4.
36
On the tensions that may arise between a public health perspective and an antidiscrimination
perspective on disability, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1385
[hereinafter Emens, Framing Disability].
37
See, e.g., RHONDA V. MAGEE, THE INNER WORK OF RACIAL JUSTICE: HEALING OURSELVES AND
TRANSFORMING OUR COMMUNITIES THROUGH MINDFULNESS (2019) [hereinafter MAGEE, INNER
WORK]; Rhonda V. Magee, The Way of ColorInsight: Understanding Race and Law Effectively Through
Mindfulness-Based ColorInsight Practices, 8 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSPS. 251, 268–81
(2016) [hereinafter Magee, The Way of ColorInsight]; Rhonda Magee, How Mindfulness Can Defeat
Racial Bias, GREATER GOOD (May 14, 2015) [hereinafter Magee, How Mindfulness Can Defeat Racial
Bias], http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/how_mindfulness_can_defeat_racial_bias; Clark
Freshman, Shauna Shapiro & Sarah de Sousa, Mindful “Judging” 1.5: The Science of Attention, “Lie
Detection,” and Bias Reduction—with Kindness, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 281, 313–16 (2016); RESMAA
MENAKEM, MY GRANDMOTHER’S HANDS: RACIALIZED TRAUMA AND THE PATHWAY TO MENDING OUR
HEARTS AND BODIES (2017); RUTH KING, MINDFUL OF RACE: TRANSFORMING RACISM FROM THE INSIDE
OUT (2018); ANGEL KYODO WILLIAMS, BEING BLACK: ZEN AND THE ART OF LIVING WITH FEARLESSNESS
AND GRACE (2000); ANGEL KYODO WILLIAMS, LAMA ROD OWENS & JASMINE SYEDULLAH, RADICAL
DHARMA: TALKING RACE, LOVE, AND LIBERATION (2016). The first three sources come from the legal
field, though their implications reach beyond law and legal institutions.
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38

legal scholarship does so. This Article therefore undertakes the tasks of
bringing empirical and other sources on meditation to bear on the problem
of disability discrimination and using this analysis to identify legal
implications. Particular dynamics surrounding disability discrimination
warrant close attention, so they are the focus of this Article. Because
disability and race discrimination entail distinct contexts and histories,39 this
Article makes no claim to be speaking to both contexts, though some
arguments will apply to both, and this Article is indebted to the growing
body of work and teaching on racism and mindfulness.
This Article comes in five parts. Part I presents the new lines of research
on meditation and bias and introduces the practice, central to these studies,
of mindfulness meditation. Part II identifies eight challenging dynamics that
underpin disability discrimination, rendering it particularly ripe for new
tools. Part III analyzes the mechanisms by which meditation may debias
disability discrimination and concludes with a chart showing how these
mechanisms correspond with the specific dynamics set out in the previous
Part. Part IV applies this analysis to disability doctrine, to demonstrate how
mindfulness practice by those who interpret and apply disability law could
have practical debiasing effects. Part V addresses potential objections. The
Article ends by considering the subject of hope, and the significance of what
we say to ourselves and to each other, during challenging times.
***
A note on how to read this Article concludes this Introduction.
Experiential education has grown increasingly central to law teaching in
recent years.40 This Article is an exercise in what might be called
experiential legal scholarship: academic articles that invite readers to reflect
on the research and ideas presented in relation to their own experience and
observations.41 Here, the experiential component includes not only
38
The one law review article that touches on disability in relation to meditation mentions “people
of different abilities” in a long list of “people who feel invisible and overlooked” who might benefit if
mindfulness practices increased the attentional focus of judges and others in and beyond the courtroom,
but the article otherwise focuses on other topics and orients its discussion of bias to other categories.
Freshman et al., supra note 37, at 291.
39
See, e.g., KHIARA M. BRIDGES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: A PRIMER 303–07 (2019) (arguing that
drawing analogies between racism and disability discrimination erases those whose identity places them
at the intersection of both). But cf. Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293, 298–
99 (2018) (arguing that blackness should be considered a disability for various purposes).
40
For an explanation of experiential legal education and its rise, see, for example, Peter A. Joy, The
Uneasy History of Experiential Education in U.S. Law Schools, 122 DICK. L. REV. 551, 567 (2018);
James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 71, 80–81 (1996).
41
Work that could be understood as engaging in experiential legal scholarship, though without
theorizing it as such, includes Daniel Del Gobbo, Feminism in Conversation: Campus Sexual Violence
and the Negotiation Within, 53 U.B.C. L.R. 591, 601 (2021) (presenting arguments about the use of
consensual dispute resolution approaches to campus sexual violence through a dialogic form that invites
the reader to occupy different positions); Freshman et al., supra note 37, at 289, 315–17 (inviting the
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reflecting on ideas about what animates disability discrimination, but also,
to the extent the reader is willing and interested, experimenting with the
practices of mindfulness described herein to see which, if any, of the
mechanisms for debiasing resonate.42 No experiential engagement is
necessary to read or evaluate the ideas in this Article, but doing so is likely
to yield a more generative, challenging, and meaningful experience.
I. THE TOOL OF MEDITATION: THE DEBIASING RESEARCH AND THE BASIC
PRACTICE
The voice in my head is an asshole.
— Dan Harris, ABC News anchor43
The epigraph to this Part captures both the problem of this Article and
its proffered solution. Disability bias is rampant, studies suggest, both
explicitly and implicitly.44 Thus, most of us have a problematic voice in our
heads—a biased voice. This troubling fact lies at the heart of this Article.
Harris’s line is also pointing us, however, to a salutary fact. There may
be something we can do about that voice. Mindfulness meditation is a tool
that may help us better address that problematic voice in our heads—and the
discriminatory actions that voice may spur.45
Disability is particular, if not unique, among protected categories, in
several ways, which this Article will discuss. Among these is the fact that
reader to try informal practices of meditation while reading); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual
Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1094–97 (2008) (introducing the central empirically
documented phenomenon of the article through an anecdote that reveals information gradually, leading
readers to experience the diverse perceptual reactions to an ambiguous scenario of bias while reading);
Emens, Intimate Discrimination, supra note 8, at 1357–62 (articulating an individual ethical self-inquiry
approach to discrimination beyond the scope of legal prohibition). While I have seen the term
“experiential legal scholarship” used by one scholar to refer to legal scholarship about experiential
learning, I have not seen anyone use the term to refer to scholarship that is itself experiential. Cf., e.g.,
Christine Coughlin, In Defense of Practical, Clinical, and Experiential Legal Scholarship, Presentation
at the Wake Forest School of Law Symposium: Revisiting Langdell: Legal Education Reform and the
Lawyer’s Craft (Oct. 23, 2015), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2015/08/2015-fall-symposium-revisiti
ng-langdell-legal-education-reform-and-the-lawyers-craft/ (advocating for more legal scholarship that
emphasizes experiential learning).
42
This invitation here is, most obviously, to try out the specific practices described in this Article,
especially in Section I.B. More generally, this Article includes epigraphs and other quotations that
contain insights worth reading carefully and considering. This asks readers to read differently than the
way the law review format, with its frequent signposting and repetition, typically encourages. The
presentation here does contain roadmaps and summaries for the reader who is skimming, but it especially
aims to reward the reader willing to slow down enough to absorb, integrate, and even reflect upon the
multidisciplinary forms of knowledge and aesthetic modes.
43
HARRIS, 10% HAPPIER, supra note 33, at xiii (capitalization and italics removed).
44
See supra notes 10, 11 (citing sources).
45
Some studies and promise may arise from other forms of meditation as well; this Article focuses
principally on mindfulness meditation, however, largely because it is the most widely taught and the
most studied. See infra Section I.B.
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disability implicates us all personally. Whether or not we are currently
disabled in any way, each of us could become disabled at any time in ways
we currently are not. Our relationship to disability is inescapable. And yet
our vulnerability does not necessarily make talking and thinking about
disability easier; on the contrary, for many people, our very vulnerability
seems to make that engagement harder. Tools for developing greater
awareness of the reality of vulnerability, disability, and disability bias—in
oneself and in others—may therefore be useful for anyone.46
In addition, with disability law we cannot even pretend that willful
ignorance of the category of disability will constitute apt remediation.47
Disability law explicitly requires accommodation, which means changing
our norms, structures, habits, and architecture—not just once but repeatedly—
which requires paying attention. We must pay attention to disability and to
the world around us. The need to look at the category is certainly not unique
to disability, but law’s recognition of this is unusual here.
This Part will begin by describing the empirical studies that suggest
mindfulness meditation could contribute to debiasing disability
discrimination. The next Part will dig deeper into key dynamics of disability
discrimination that make it particularly appropriate for the tool of
mindfulness meditation. The purpose of this Part is to frame that deep dive.
As noted in the Introduction, the empirical research on debiasing disability
through meditation is at an early stage, too early to be conclusive. The
studies nonetheless prompt an inquiry into what mindfulness meditation is,
so we can begin to examine how it might help with debiasing. This Part will
therefore conclude with a brief explanation of the tool of mindfulness: what
it is, how it is practiced, and why it is difficult. That Section especially
invites the experiential approach to reading discussed earlier.48
A. Debiasing Through Meditation: The Studies
The empirical work on debiasing disability discrimination through
meditation is so provisional that this Section begins by briefly discussing
debiasing research focused on other axes of identity. Note, in addition, that
46

Note that people with disabilities are often intensely aware of disability and used to talking about
it; however, becoming aware of one disability, even having that disability, does not necessarily entail
comfort with another. A person who uses a wheelchair could be uncomfortable interacting with someone
who is HIV positive and, while engagement with disability as a category and identity might counteract
that, the mere fact of having an impairment need not.
47
Whether so pretending constitutes apt remediation in any other area is fiercely debated. I believe
the lessons from disability can be applied to other areas, where willful ignorance in the name of
“colorblindness” is unlikely to help, and will likely harm, the project of racial justice. But this topic, on
which others have written well and much, is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Paul-Emile, supra
note 39, at 293, 296 (arguing that “[t]raditional race jurisprudence….promotes the impractical norm of
colorblindness,” which hinders efforts to remedy past discrimination); see generally David A. Strauss,
The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99; see also text accompanying note 166.
48
See supra text accompanying note 42.
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nothing in this Article depends on finding the empirical work convincing.
These studies are a jumping-off point for the rest of the inquiry.
Moreover, beyond the quantitative studies, important work has been
examining and exploring the ways mindfulness and other forms of
meditation can help to combat race discrimination and racial injustice.
Important books by Rhonda Magee,49 Ruth King,50 Reverend angel Kyodo
williams,51 Lama Rod Owens,52 and Resmaa Menakem,53 among others,54
have powerfully argued for the role of mindfulness in tackling racial
injustice and healing racial trauma. No books have focused on the
intersection of disability rights and mindfulness, but Joan Tollifson, who
was among the disability activists who occupied the San Francisco Federal
Building in the late 1970s to protest the non-release of implementing
regulations for the Rehabilitation Act,55 has written a powerful essay on the
uses of meditation for changing hearts and minds around disability; 56 this
essay is quoted throughout this Article.
This Section focuses on quantitative empirical literature, emphasizing
the work on disability after a brief introduction to studies of race and other
axes of identity. But later Sections are informed by, and present
opportunities for reflection on, writing in modes beyond the quantitative.
1. Introducing the Research on Debiasing Through Meditation
Consider this experimental study by Adam Lueke and Bryan Gibson: 57
Subjects in the experimental condition, who were new to meditation, were
given a ten-minute “dose” of guided mindfulness meditation; by contrast,
the control group listened to a ten-minute description of the English
countryside.58 Following the listening stage, all subjects participated in a
49
MAGEE, INNER WORK, supra note 37. Magee has also written foundational articles on the
subject⎯see, for example, Magee, The Way of ColorInsight, supra note 37.
50
KING, supra note 37.
51
WILLIAMS, supra note 37; WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 37.
52
LAMA ROD OWENS, LOVE AND RAGE: THE PATH OF LIBERATION THROUGH ANGER (2020);
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 37.
53
MENAKEM, supra note 37.
54
See, e.g., BUDDHISM AND WHITENESS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS (George Yancy & Emily McRae
eds., 2019).
55
See Susan Merrill Squier, Meditation, Disability, and Identity, 23 LITERATURE & MED. 23, 28
(2004) (describing Tollifson’s evolution as an activist and journey to practicing Zen Buddhism); see also
Ruth Colker, The Power of Insults, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1, 38 (2020) (“[T]he disability rights community
held a twenty-eight-day sit-in at a San Francisco federal building to force the federal government to issue
regulations to enforce Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act . . . .”).
56
Joan Tollifson, Imperfection Is a Beautiful Thing: On Disability and Meditation, in STARING
BACK: THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 105 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997).
57
Adam Lueke & Brian Gibson, Brief Mindfulness Meditation Reduces Discrimination, 3 PSYCH.
CONSCIOUSNESS: THEORY, RESEARCH, & PRACTICE 34 (2016).
58
Id. at 37. An attentional control group heard the same description of the countryside, but first
received a prompt to listen for the word “parish” and make a checkmark when they heard it; they were
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trust game. The goal of the game was to end up with the most game
money.60 A subject had to decide how much game money to give each of
150 counterpart “participants” (i.e., photos of faces of varying races),
knowing that the counterpart would receive quadruple the amount given, and
that the counterpart had already decided whether to give half of it back to
the giver.61 The subjects, who were White undergraduate students,62 all
showed more trust of White than of Black faces—that is, they gave more
game money to White than Black counterparts, suggesting that they
expected the White counterparts would be more likely to be giving them
back half of it.63 However, the subjects who listened to the ten-minute
mindfulness meditation showed significantly less bias toward White
counterparts than did the controls.64
Though the study has limitations and requires replication,65 this is a very
interesting finding. Experimental subjects who participated in a short guided
mindfulness meditation made less racially biased decisions about their
behavior in a trust game than a control group who listened to a short
narration. These were not people who sought out meditation for personal
reasons, but participated only as part of the experiment, and the dose was
just one short meditation.
There have been a range of other studies on the potential of mindfulness
and other forms of meditation to reduce bias along various axes of identity.66
For instance, in another study by Lueke and Gibson, White participants
also told they would be tested on the content later. Id. There was no difference in results between the
attentional control group and the pure control group, so my textual discussion is focused on the pure
control. Id. at 38.
59
Id. at 36.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 36–37. They started with $50 in game money, and they could give between $0 and $10 to
each of the 150 counterparts in the photos. Id. They were told that the participant who ended with the
most money would win twenty actual dollars. Id. at 36.
62
Id. at 35. On my reasons for capitalizing White as well as Black, see Eve L. Ewing, I’m a Black
Scholar Who Studies Race. Here’s Why I Capitalize ‘White,’ MEDIUM (July 2, 2020), https://zora.medi
um.com/im-a-black-scholar-who-studies-race-here-s-why-i-capitalize-white-f94883aa2dd3.
63
Id. at 38.
64
Id. at 39.
65
The study has several limitations in addition to a small sample size. First, the study looks only at
attitudes of Whites to non-Whites. In addition, although the 150 faces in the photos of the alleged
counterparts included fifty faces of Whites, fifty of Blacks, and fifty of Middle Eastern and Asian descent,
the study reported only the result with regard to Blacks and Whites. Moreover, the study does not report
whether any of the participants had prior experience with mindfulness—though they did test for “trait
mindfulness” before the study and found no significant differences between groups. Id. at 36. The authors
speculate that perhaps a larger dose of mindfulness, or a different test for state mindfulness, would bring
out a relationship between state mindfulness scores and behavior in the trust game, but this is speculation.
Id. at 40–41.
66
In addition to the studies discussed here, see, for example, Jason Lillis & Steven C. Hayes,
Applying Acceptance, Mindfulness, and Values to the Reduction of Prejudice: A Pilot Study, 31 BEHAV.
MODIFICATION 389, 391 (2007) (studying “acceptance and commitment therapy,” a mindfulnessbuilding practice, as a tool for “reducing racial and ethnic prejudice”).
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showed less biased implicit attitudes toward Black people and older people
after a ten-minute guided mindfulness meditation.67 In a different study, akin
to Lueke and Gibson’s on age bias, Edwards and colleagues found that a
meditation involving concentration on the breath reduced racial bias more
than an instruction for participants to let their minds wander.68 And in a study
by Ellen Langer and colleagues, an exercise in what the authors call
“mindfulness” led to less evidence of implicit bias toward older people.69
Some studies explicitly invoke other types of meditation to reach
conclusions about debiasing. For example, a study by Kang and her
colleagues found that a different form of meditation—called lovingkindness
meditation70—led to lower levels of implicit bias toward Black people and
homeless people, among a subject pool of non-Black subjects.71 A very
67

Adam Lueke & Bryan Gibson, Mindfulness Meditation Reduces Implicit Age and Race Bias: The
Role of Reduced Automaticity of Responding, 6 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 284, 287 (2015)
(reporting on a study of seventy-two White college students finding that, for White participants, listening
to a ten-minute instruction in mindfulness meditation, involving non-judgmental awareness of breath and
heartbeat, led to higher levels of “state mindfulness” and lower scores on measures of implicit bias
towards Black and older people).
68
Darren J. Edwards, Cierra McEnteggart, Yvonne Barnes-Holmes, Rob Lowe, Nicky Evans &
Roger Vilardaga, The Impact of Mindfulness and Perspective-Taking on Implicit Associations Toward
the Elderly: A Relational Frame Theory Account, 8 MINDFULNESS 1615, 1619 (2017).
69
Maja Djikic, Ellen J. Langer & Sarah Fulton Stapleton, Reducing Stereotyping Through
Mindfulness: Effects on Automatic Stereotype-Activated Behaviors, 15 J. ADULT DEV. 106, 106 (2008).
70
This form of meditation involves silently repeating a set of phrases of well-wishing, directly
toward oneself and specific others, typically a benefactor (someone for whom it is easy to feel kindness);
a friend; a neutral person (someone about whom one feels neither good nor ill, which can be rather
difficult to find, and therefore need not be a perfect exemplar of neutrality); a difficult person (though
traditionally called “the enemy,” this person need not be the most difficult person, but just someone
slightly annoying or difficult); and all beings everywhere. The silent phrases become the “anchor” or
object of focus, much like the breath can be the anchor, and when the mind wanders from the phrases,
similar opportunities are presented to practice kindness and beginning anew. See, e.g., SHARON
SALZBERG, LOVINGKINDNESS: THE REVOLUTIONARY ART OF HAPPINESS (1995) [hereinafter SALZBERG,
LOVINGKINDNESS] (offering a comprehensive, engaging, and practical guide to lovingkindness
meditation); see also Toni Bernhard, Lovingkindness Practice, PSYCH. TODAY (Feb. 17, 2012),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/turning-straw-gold/201202/lovingkindness-practice (providing,
inter alia, brief instructions on how to practice lovingkindness meditation). The aim is not to feel anything
special while sending out these phrases of well-wishing, but just to send them out repeatedly. Some
understand the purpose of lovingkindness meditation to be overcoming so-called negativity bias (i.e., the
human tendency to hear one bad thing and several good things and yet focus on the bad thing). See, e.g.,
Ask Dr. Rick About: Negativity Bias, RICK HANSON, https://www.rickhanson.net/ask-dr-rick/negativitybias/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (stating that evolution has wired human beings to learn from negative
experiences, resulting in “most positive experiences flow[ing] through the brain like water … while
negative ones are caught every time”); infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing and citing
further sources on negativity bias).
71
Yoona Kang, Jeremy R. Gray & John F. Dovidio, The Nondiscriminating Heart: Lovingkindness
Meditation Training Decreases Implicit Intergroup Bias, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 1, 1–2 (2013)
(finding that a six-week practice of “lovingkindness” meditation by 101 healthy, non-Black subjects with
no prior experience with lovingkindness meditation led to reductions in implicit bias against “Blacks”
and “homeless people,” and that discussions of lovingkindness for a comparable time period did not lead
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recent study found that a nine-week training combining lovingkindness
and mindfulness meditation reduced implicit race bias among a
predominantly White group of teacher trainees, a result that persisted to the
six-month follow-up.72
Other studies look at different dimensions of the potential impact of
meditation on bias and discrimination. For instance, one study found that an
eight-week mindfulness-based stress reduction course led Jewish-Israeli
university students, compared with controls, to express less negative
emotion, less perceived threat, and greater support for compromise with
Palestinians living in Israel.73 Other studies, like the Lueke and Gibson trustgame study described above, specifically find that mindfulness and other
forms of meditation affect behavior or behavioral correlates.74
A recent review of the prejudice-reduction literature described
mindfulness-based approaches as a “promising direction in prejudice
reduction research,” amidst a field that has struggled to generate compelling
evidence to establish the effectiveness of any particular intervention.75
Comparing types of interventions, the authors observe that “the application
of mindfulness to the area of prejudice reduction is still in its infancy, [but]
there are some indications that it can be effective.”76
2. Studies Focused on Debiasing Disability Discrimination
A small set of studies has begun to find a relationship between
meditation and reduced stereotyping or less negative attitudes to disability,
though these studies require even more development. Recall that the aim of
reviewing these quantitative studies is not to persuade the reader that their

to such reductions, nor were such reductions seen in a waitlist control; and finding that reductions in
stress levels mediated the finding for attitudes to homeless people but not for attitudes to Black people).
72
Matthew Hirshberg, Lisa Flook, Evan Moss, Robert Enright & Richard Davidson, Integrating
Mindfulness and Connection Practices into Preservice Teacher Education Results in Durable Automatic
Race Bias Reductions, 91 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 50, 58–62 (2022).
73
Alon Alkoby, Eran Halperin, Ricardo Tarrasch & Nava Levit-Binnun, Increased Support for
Political Compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Following an 8-Week Mindfulness Workshop, 8
MINDFULNESS 1345, 1345–46 (2017).
74
See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Lillis & Hayes, supra note 66, at
406 (writing that “focusing mindfully and nonjudgmentally on the process of thinking instead of the
products of thinking reduces the impact of cognitive content and loosens its behavior regulatory power”,
resulting in “decategorization” of people and “experiential contact with common aspects of humanity”);
Daniel R. Berry, Bridging the Empathy Gap: Effects of Brief Mindfulness Training on Helping Outgroup
Members in Need 87–89 (Apr. 2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University) (finding
that “even brief mindfulness training increased post-intervention helping frequency in a staged scenario,”
although more sustained mindfulness training was required to increase long-term, routine altruism).
75
William Somerville, Sophia Williams Kapten, Iris Yi Miao, Jordan J. Dunn & Doris F. Chang,
Identifying and Remediating Personal Prejudice: What Does the Evidence Say?, in PREJUDICE, STIGMA,
PRIVILEGE, AND OPPRESSION: A BEHAVIORAL HEALTH HANDBOOK 179, 189 (Lorraine T. Benuto,
Melanie P. Duckworth, Akihiko Masuda & William O’Donohue eds., 2020).
76
Id.
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results support a conclusion about mindfulness and disability discrimination,
but to highlight this new field of study and frame the discussion that follows.
In 2016, Sarah Schimchowitsch and Odile Rohmer published a study
comparing meditators and non-meditators on an “evaluative priming task”
to measure implicit disability bias. 77 The task primed participants by
presenting them with symbols that did or did not represent disability—
quickly enough that participants were not conscious of seeing the symbols—
and then measured how quickly participants identified positive and negative
valence of words.78 This priming tool was designed to prevent subjects from
recognizing that their responses might be revealing bias toward a particular
group by keeping all reference to the target population outside of conscious
awareness.79 The subjects consisted of a group of forty experienced
meditators (with at least one year’s experience) contrasted with a group of
thirty-four individuals with no background in meditation.80
Schimchowitsch and Rohmer found results consistent with generalized
disability prejudice in the non-meditator group, but not in the meditator
group. More specifically, after being exposed to the disability prime, the
non-meditators more readily identified negative items and less readily
identified positive items; in other words, the finding suggests they implicitly
associate disability with negativity. By contrast, the meditator group was no
less able to identify positive items after being exposed to the disability
prime.81 The authors concluded that the “prejudice effect was attributable
solely to [the] disability prime.”82 The study had a number of limitations, as
the authors acknowledged,83 in addition to the small sample size, which is
pervasive in the extant research on mindfulness and bias thus far; most
notably, the study could not disaggregate correlation and causation.84
77
Sarah Schimchowitsch & Odile Rohmer, Can We Reduce Our Implicit Prejudice Toward Persons
with Disability? The Challenge of Meditation, 63 INT’L J. DISABILITY, DEV. & EDUC. 641, 641 (2016).
78
Id. at 643–44.
79
Id. at 643.
80
Id. at 643–44. The authors described the meditator group as having been “recruited from local
yoga centers offering sessions of attentional meditation practice focused on breath and bodily sensory
perception. These participants practice together at least once a week and regularly alone at home. They
were assessed directly after a meditation session.” The authors described the non-meditator group as
“recruited in respect to age and gender of meditators” and recruited “among meditators friends and
colleagues [sic], [who] reported having no experience in any kind of meditation, yoga or relaxation
techniques.” All subjects were, like the authors of the study, French. Id. at 643.
81
Id. at 645.
82
Id. This result reached statistical significance at the level of p < .10, which is not quite statistical
significance by most conventional measures, as noted below. Id.; see also infra note 84.
83
Id. at 647.
84
Id. First, the result reaches statistical significance only at a level slightly short of standard
measures, id. at 645; supra note 82. Second, as noted in the text, nothing in the study proves that
meditation causes rather than merely correlates with less disability bias. The meditating subjects
consisted entirely of people who had voluntarily chosen to pursue meditation practice; as the authors
note, it is possible that those people have less disability bias to begin with. Schimchowitsch & Rohmer,
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Another study that has specifically found mindfulness to debias
disability discrimination in particular bears a stronger relationship to
behavior, though it has other limitations. In a paper provocatively titled,
Decreasing Prejudice by Increasing Discrimination, Langer and her
colleagues at Harvard report that prompting subjects to attend to more details
led to less stereotyping of people with disabilities.85 The authors
operationalized what they called “mindfulness” by, for instance, asking
subjects to write down four reasons—rather than just one reason—why a
person in a picture (with or without a disability) might be good (or bad) at
his or her profession.86 In the high-mindfulness condition, subjects were
asked for more reasons; in the low-mindfulness condition, subjects were
asked for one reason.87 The hypothesis was that training subjects to pay
attention to details would lead them to pay more attention to the diverse
features of people with disabilities—not just their impairment.88
The authors conclude that the results confirmed their hypothesis.89 For
instance, subjects in the high-mindfulness condition were more likely to
report an interest in going on a picnic planned by a boy with a visible
disability.90 They were also more likely to report a willingness to play sports
with children with particular disabilities—where the particular disabilities
would help or not hinder their ability to play the particular sport (for
instance, wheelchair races for a child pictured in a wheelchair)—but not
where those disabilities would apparently hinder the disabled child’s ability
to play the sport (for instance, soccer for a child in a wheelchair).91 The
authors interpret this to suggest that subjects in the high-mindfulness
condition are paying attention to specifics about the individual and his
disability, rather than applying a blanket stigma or stereotype.92
This study also had a small sample size: forty-seven sixth grade
students,93 and so the subjects were children.94 The results here were
statistically significant, though in one instance pointed in the opposite

supra note 77, at 647 (“Notably, this research focused on people who deliberately chose an approach of
personal development and might be more open to others and less prejudiced than the mainstream
population.”). In addition, the study measures only attitudes and not behavior. Id. Finally, the study does
nothing to disentangle any effects from regular meditation practice as opposed to meditation practice
immediately before the attitudinal measure—since the measure was taken just after a meditation practice
among people who had practiced for at least a year.
85
Ellen J. Langer, Richard S. Bashner & Benzion Chanowitz, Decreasing Prejudice by Increasing
Discrimination, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 113, 113 (1985).
86
Id. at 115.
87
Id. at 114.
88
Id. at 115.
89
Id. at 117.
90
Id. at 118.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 119.
93
Id. at 115 (reporting a subject pool of forty-seven sixth grade students).
94
Id.
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direction of the hypothesis, at least initially.95 Most notably, the authors
referred to this as a study of mindfulness, but they were not studying
mindfulness meditation. Rather they offered a conception of mindfulness
that seems to mean something more like discernment—the opposite of
mindlessness.96 (The next Section will discuss what is meant in this Article
by mindfulness and mindfulness meditation.)
A recent unpublished undergraduate thesis found no effect on implicit
disability bias of an intervention using mindfulness meditation similar to the
Lueke and Gibson study discussed first (involving the trust game);
however, the study did find significant effects of a lovingkindness
meditation intervention.97 Another recent study found that a ten-minute
mindfulness meditation did not directly improve the explicit attitudes of preservice teachers toward including students with autism, but did improve the
teachers’ basic psychological needs satisfaction—which the authors argue
can indirectly affect teacher attitudes toward students with disabilities.98
These studies are examples of the increasing attention to these intersections,
which should lead to more revealing empirical findings in the coming years.
One further study bears mention here. The focus of this study was not
disability discrimination per se,99 but “prosocial behaviors meant to benefit
others,” namely, compassion-based behavior toward people who appeared
to be injured.100 The study examined the waiting-room behavior of subjects
who had participated in a three-week, self-guided mindfulness meditation
training (using the meditation app Headspace) versus controls who engaged
in a three-week, self-guided “cognitive training program” (using
www.lumosity.com).101 Subjects entered a waiting room with three chairs,
two already occupied.102 The following then took place, for each participant:
After a participant had been sitting for 1 minute, a female
confederate, playing the role of the “sufferer,” appeared from
around the corner down the hallway with the use of a large
95

Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 113–14.
97
Tai Bendit-Shtull, Combating Implicit Bias with Meditation 51–52 (May 2017) (Undergraduate
thesis, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Scholarly Commons, University of Pennsylvania),
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1149&context=wharton_research_scholars.
98
Chunxiao Li, Ngai Kiu Wong, Duo Liu & Ying Hwa Kee, Effects of Brief Mindfulness Meditation
on Pre-service Teachers’ Attitudes Towards Including Students with Autism: The Role of Basic
Psychological Need Satisfaction, INT’L J. DISABILITY DEV. & EDUC. 1, 8–10 (2020).
99
On the complexity of attitudes that could be characterized as “pity” or “charity” toward disabled
people, see, for example, JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY 4–5 (1994); Elaine Makas, Positive Attitudes
Toward Disabled People: Disabled and Nondisabled Persons’ Perspectives, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 49, 58–
59 (1988).
100
Daniel Lim, Paul Condon & David DeSteno, Mindfulness and Compassion: An Examination of
Mechanism and Scalability, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2015).
101
Id. at 3.
102
Id. at 4.
96
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walking boot and a pair of crutches. She walked with some
difficulty and expressions of mild pain (i.e., wincing). Upon
arriving in the waiting area, the suffering confederate stopped
beside the seat furthest away from the participant, let out an
audible sigh of discomfort, and leaned against the wall as if
she were also waiting for an experiment.103
The researchers found that those subjects who had completed the three-week
mindfulness program were two and a half times more likely to offer their
seat to the suffering entrant.104 We will return to this study.
B. Mindfulness Meditation: The Tool
The instructions were reassuringly simple:
1. Sit comfortably. . . .
2. Feel the sensations of your breath as it goes in and out.
Pick a spot: nostrils, chest, or gut. Focus your attention and
really try to feel the breath. . . .
3. This one, according to all of the books I’d read, was the
biggie. Whenever your attention wanders, just forgive
yourself and gently come back to the breath. You don’t need
to clear the mind of all thinking; that’s pretty much
impossible. . . . The whole game is to catch your mind
wandering and then come back to the breath, over and over
again.
– Dan Harris105
This Article assumes no prior knowledge of meditation among readers,
so this Section offers a short introduction. There are many forms of
meditation and many ways to describe the forms people practice.106 The
whole idea of meditation is off-putting to some, which may be why some
people decline labels.107 Justice Breyer, for instance, has said, “I don't know
that what I do is meditation, or even whether it has a name. For 10 or 15
minutes twice a day I sit peacefully. I relax and think about nothing or as
little as possible.”108 Labels are nonetheless helpful to communicating ideas
103

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
105
HARRIS, 10% HAPPIER, supra note 33, at 100.
106
For some discussion, see, for example, Matthieu Ricard, Antoine Lutz & Richard Davidson,
Mind of the Meditator, 311 SCI. AMER. 39, 40–42 (2014).
107
See, e.g., Freshman et al., supra note 37, at 281–82.
108
Amanda Enayati, Seeking Serenity: When Lawyers Go Zen, CNN: THE CHART, (May 11, 2011,
11:15 AM), http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/11/seeking-serenity-when-lawyers-go-zen. In the
same interview, Justice Breyer elsewhere referred to what he does as meditation before abandoning the
label again:
104
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and translating experience into usable form for others, so this Section defines
terms and explains practices.
Of the many types of meditation, the secular type most practiced in this
country—and particularly promising for addressing disability bias for
reasons I will discuss—can be called mindfulness meditation.109 This Section
will briefly explain what mindfulness is, what mindfulness meditation is,
why people practice it (rather than just doing it), and how people practice it.
1. Defining Mindfulness
Mindfulness is defined by Jon Kabat-Zinn, who began much of the
Western research of mindfulness meditation through a program he founded
at the University of Massachusetts Medical School in 1979, as follows:
“intentional cultivation of nonjudgmental moment-to-moment awareness.”110
Though accurate, this definition is complex. A simpler version is paying
attention to whatever is happening right now without judgment.
Much of this definition is self-explanatory. Mindfulness means noticing
what sounds you hear now or what bodily sensations you feel. The aim is
not to think about those sensations, but just to notice or feel them. The aim
is to take in the raw data of perception.
The meaning of the phrase “without judgment” is less obvious—and it
sounds like it might directly contradict legal training or practice.111 “Without
judgment” does not mean without discernment or common sense, however.
It does not mean that if the fire alarm went off wherever you are sitting right
now, mindfulness would lead you just to sit there and notice the sound.
[R]eally I started because it’s good for my health. My wife said this would be good
for your blood pressure and she was right. It really works. I read once that the practice
of law is like attempting to drink water from a fire hose. And if you are under stress,
meditation—or whatever you choose to call it—helps. Very often I find myself in
circumstances that may be considered stressful, say in oral arguments where I have to
concentrate very hard for extended periods. If I come back at lunchtime, I sit for 15
minutes and perhaps another 15 minutes later. Doing this makes me feel more
peaceful, focused and better able to do my work.
Id.
109

See, e.g., Adam Burke, Chun Nok Lam, Barbara Stussman & Hui Yang, Prevalence and Patterns
of Use of Mantra, Mindfulness and Spiritual Meditation Among Adults in the United States, 17 BMC
COMPLEMENTARY AND ALT. MED. 316, 316 (2017) (describing “mindfulness meditation” as
“involv[ing] ongoing, non-reactive awareness or monitoring of the present moment, of one’s
phenomenological experience”); Natalia E. Morone, Charity G. Moore & Carol M. Greco,
Characteristics of Adults Who Used Mindfulness Meditation: United States, 2012, 23 J. ALT. &
COMPLEMENTARY MED. 545, 545 (2017), https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/acm.2016.0099
(estimating that 2,029,720 adults practiced mindfulness meditation in the United States in 2012).
110
Jon Kabat-Zinn, Mindfulness Meditation: What It Is, What It Isn’t, and Its Role in Heath Care
and Medicine, in COMPARATIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY ON MEDITATION 161, 161 (Y. Haruki, Y.
Ishii & M. Suzuki eds., 2007).
111
For more discussion of this issue, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Law’s Contributions to the Mindfulness
Revolution, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Emens, Law’s Contributions to Mindfulness].
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Rather, “without judgment” means without indulging the snarky inner critic
in your head,112 who tends to suffer from a kind of “negativity bias” (which
is not clear seeing, but instead, as its name suggests, a bias or skew away
from reality).113 More on this idea shortly, but note that this notion of
“without judgment” is therefore not inconsistent with judging or with the
keen analysis often required of lawyers.114 On the contrary, mindfulness is a
training to support clear seeing of reality and unbiased assessment.
2. Describing Mindfulness Meditation
You can be mindful anytime. Like right now: You can notice the feeling
of your feet on the ground. You can pay attention to the feeling of taking one
breath. Rather than think about the concept of breathing, you could notice
how breathing feels in the body, like how you would dip your hand in water
to see if it feels warm or cold.115 You could do these things while also reading
these words.
“Mindfulness meditation,” in contrast to just being mindful, refers to the
act of setting aside time to engage in the formal practice of paying attention,
without doing anything else at the same time. For instance, you could decide
to take five minutes or twenty minutes or one minute to do nothing other
than pay attention to whatever is happening right now. If you chose to
practice formal meditation of this sort, you would stop reading and put aside
this Article; you would either close your eyes or take a soft gaze on the floor;
and your sole purpose for that time would be mindful awareness (and getting
112

See infra Section I.B.3 (discussing that harshly critical inner voice and citing sources).
On negativity bias, see, for example, Roy F. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky & Catrin Finkenauer,
Bad Is Stronger Than Good, 5 REV. OF GEN. PSYCH. 323, 324, 354 (2001) (“The principle that bad is
stronger than good appears to be consistently supported across a broad range of psychological
phenomena.”); Rick Hanson, Stephen Colbert: We Don’t Need to “Keep Fear Alive”, DR. RICK
HANSON’S BLOG (Oct. 3, 2010), https://www.rickhanson.net/stephen-colbert-we-dont-need-to-keepfear-alive/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2022) (describing the brain as, in effect, “like Velcro for negative
experiences but Teflon for positive ones); Kendra Cherry, What Is the Negativity Bias?, VERYWELL
MIND (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.verywellmind.com/negative-bias-4589618 (describing negativity
bias as “our tendency not only to register negative stimuli more readily but also to dwell on these
events”); see also Laura G. Kiken & Natalie J. Shook, Looking Up: Mindfulness Increases Positive
Judgments and Reduces Negativity Bias, 2 SOC. PSYCH. AND PERS. SCI. 425, 429 (2011) (concluding
from an empirical study of 175 undergraduate psychology students that “mindfulness can reduce
negativity bias and increase positive judgments”); see generally Roy F. Baumeister & John Tierney, THE
POWER OF BAD: HOW THE NEGATIVITY EFFECT RULES US AND HOW WE CAN RULE IT (2019).
114
See, e.g., Fogel, supra note 32, at 2–4 (explaining, based on his experience as a judge, the
benefits of mindfulness meditation to judges); Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the
Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002). But cf., e.g., Michal Tamir, Law and Yoga, 7 J.L. & SOC. DEVIANCE 1, 3
(2014) (arguing that “yoga focuses in the most extreme way on the given moment, whereas law looks to
the past and the future, particularly with regard to precedents”).
115
This metaphor for mindful awareness of sensation—of feeling your hand in water to sense the
temperature—comes from a meditation by Sharon Salzberg. See Sharon Salzberg, Breath Meditation,
INSIGHT TIMER, https://insighttimer.com/sharonsalzberg/guided-meditations/breath-meditation (last
visited Mar. 8, 2022).
113
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distracted and noticing that and beginning again).
You might choose a central object of focus, like the breath or sound, and
rest your awareness gently on it. And then, when your mind wanders, you
would notice that fact—recognizing that that moment of noticing the mind
has wandered is “mindfulness”—and bring your mind back to that anchor.
This is sometimes called a “concentration” or “focused attention” meditation
because you are aiming your concentration at something: the anchor of
breath or sound.116
Alternatively, you might decide just to notice, moment to moment,
whatever feeling, thought, sound, or sensation enters your awareness, one
after the next, without tethering yourself to one input as an anchor. This is
sometimes called “open awareness” or “open monitoring” meditation
because you are not directing your mind to a particular anchor but are
constantly aware of what is coming to mind.117 Though some would debate
this choice, this Article calls both approaches versions of “mindfulness
meditation” because both practices cultivate the moment of noticing.118
In sum, the practice of mindfulness meditation includes the three parts
of the definition: (1) paying attention; (2) to whatever is happening right
now; and (3) without judgment. And these track the three parts of these
basic instructions:
1) Pay attention: Stop doing whatever else you are doing (it
may help to close your eyes or lower your gaze) and rest
your awareness on an anchor (like the breath, sound, or
bodily sensations).
2) To whatever is happening: When you realize your mind has
wandered, notice that (that is mindfulness).
3) Without judgment: And then, instead of beating yourself up
about the wandering mind, practice kindness: Realize that
minds wander—that’s what they do—and the moment you
noticed that your mind had wandered was mindfulness.
And that moment also provided an opportunity to practice
gently bringing your awareness back to your anchor. (Dan
Harris calls that moment of noticing the wandering a

116

See, e.g., Ricard et al., supra 106, at 41 (terming a version of this practice “focused attention”).
See, e.g., id. at 41 (calling this “mindfulness” or “open-monitoring meditation”).
118
For instance, Ricard et al., id. at 41, would call only the latter “mindfulness” meditation, and
they do not emphasize the moment of noticing the mind has wandered in concentration practice. The
interweaving of concentration and open awareness practice described herein is frequently offered by U.S.
meditation teachers. Following this approach, this Article treats both the practice of resting awareness on
an anchor and noticing when the mind has wandered, on the one hand, and the practice of letting go of
an anchor and noticing whatever enters awareness, on the other, as forms of mindfulness meditation practice.
117
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“mental pushup” ; Sharon Salzberg calls it, more
ethereally, “the magic moment” of mindfulness.120)
Practicing mindfulness is, simply, doing that over and over and over . . .
3. Explaining Mindfulness Meditation
Why do this? Why practice formal mindfulness meditation, rather than
simply being mindful of whatever you are doing? If you could read this
Article and get some mindfulness done at the same time, that might seem
preferable. It certainly seems more efficient.
The difficulty is that, while we could be mindful at any moment, most
of the time most of us are not. We are lost in thought. We are rushing forward
into the future—planning, hoping, fearing—or looking backwards on the
past—assessing, longing, regretting. So, we are generally not so good at the
“right now” part of mindfulness (which, you will recall, we have defined as
“paying attention to whatever is happening right now without judgment”).
Most of us are also not so good at the “without judgment” part. As Dan
Harris told us at the start, “the voice in my head is an asshole.”121 Arianna
Huffington describes that voice as “the obnoxious roommate living in our
head.”122 It therefore takes practice to replace that voice, or dilute the impact
of that voice, with a kinder one. The first step is quieting things down enough
even to hear our inner voice—the one that is typically very critical (of ourselves,
of other people, or both)—so that we can begin to offer up an alternative.
This explains how practicing mindfulness meditation helps with being
mindful.123 Other utilitarian reasons people practice meditation vary widely.
Two significant empirical findings include improvements in attentional
focus (learning to focus on what you want to focus on) 124 and emotional
119

Ten Percent Happier with Dan Harris, ABC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.globalplayer.c
om/podcasts/episodes/7DrZ58u/.
120
SHARON SALZBERG, REAL HAPPINESS: THE POWER OF MEDITATION 49 (2011) [hereinafter
SALZBERG, REAL HAPPINESS].
121
HARRIS, supra note 33, at xiii (uppercase and italics removed).
122
Arianna Huffington, Evicting the Obnoxious Roommate in Your Head, MEDIUM (Nov. 30, 2016),
https://medium.com/thrive-global/evicting-the-obnoxious-roommate-in-your-head-1848db7c9d75.
123
This point represents the distinction between “formal” and “informal” mindfulness practice—
where formal practice is setting aside dedicated time just to meditate, without doing anything else at the
same time; and informal practice is just invoking mindfulness (or another practice) while going through
the day doing other things. For discussions and examples of some informal practices, see, for example,
Freshman et al., supra note 37, at 287–88, 299–300; Magee, How Mindfulness Can Defeat Racial Bias,
supra note 37. The question of how long one needs to meditate to get the benefits is a subject of ongoing
research. Some claim that five minutes or even shorter periods suffice. See, e.g., Freshman et al., supra
note 37, at 292 (citing study by one coauthor). Regardless of the shortest period possible to see any effects,
various work supports the idea that more time than the minimum leads to more benefits. See, e.g., id.
124
See, e.g., Elisa H. Kozasa, João R. Sato, Shirley S. Lacerda, Maria A.M. Barreiros, João
Radvany, Tamara A. Russell, Liana G. Sanches, Luiz E.A.M. Mello & Edson Amaro Jr., Meditation
Training Increases Brain Efficiency in an Attention Task, 59 NEUROIMAGE 745, 745 (2012); Rodrigo
Becerra, Coralyn Dandrade & Craig Harms, Can Specific Attentional Skills Be Modified with
Mindfulness Training for Novice Practitioners?, 36 CURRENT PSYCH. 657, 657 (2017).
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self-regulation (managing your emotions and responses to them rather than
being controlled by them).125 More broadly, the burgeoning literature in this
area reports wide-ranging health benefits to body and mind, for instance,
improvements with regard to chronic depression, pain management, healthy
sleep, heart disease, and even lifespan.126
***
So now we know something about how to meditate. And we also know
the contours of the relevant research on debiasing through meditation. The
limited research that exists on debiasing disability discrimination tells us
little about the mechanism by which debiasing may be occurring, and even
the studies of debiasing along other identity axes are thin as to how this
occurs. Exploring that question is the challenge of the next two Parts.
II. DYNAMICS OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
The existential anxiety triggered by disabilities occasionally
may become the subject of conscious attention. Sometimes
these concerns are evident in the silent thought that “there,
but for the grace of God (or luck or fate or other fundamental
beliefs), go I.” At other times, these worries may be verbalized
in statements such as, “I would rather be dead than live as a
paraplegic (or as blind, deaf, or immobilized).” In fact, the
threat of a permanent and debilitating disability, with its

125
See, e.g., Britta K. Hölzel, James Carmody, Mark Vangel, Christina Congleton, Sita M.
Yerramsetti, Tim Gard & Sara W. Lazar, Mindfulness Practice Leads to Increases in Regional Brain
Gray Matter Density, 191 PSYCHIATRY RSCH. 36, 36 (2011); Julia C. Basso, Alexandra McHale, Victoria
Ende, Douglas J. Oberlin & Wendy A. Suzuki, Brief, Daily Meditation Enhances Attention, Memory,
Mood, and Emotional Regulation in Non-Experienced Meditators, 356 BEHAV. BRAIN RSCH. 208, 208–
09 (2019); Clive J. Robins, Shian-Ling Keng, Andrew G. Ekblad & Jeffrey G. Brantley, Effects of
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction on Emotional Experience and Expression: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 68 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 117, 117, 127 (2012); see generally SALZBERG, REAL
HAPPINESS, supra note 120, at 18–34.
126
See, e.g., Bassam Khoury, Tania Lecomte, Guillaume Fortin, Marjolaine Masse, Phillip Therien,
Vanessa Bouchard, Marie-Andrée Chapleau, Karine Paquin & Stefan G. Hofmann, Mindfulness-Based
Therapy: A Comprehensive Meta-Analysis, 33 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 763, 763, 769 (2013); Peter la
Cour & Marian Petersen, Effects of Mindfulness Meditation on Chronic Pain: A Randomized Controlled
Trial, 16 PAIN MED. 641, 641, 649 (2015); Joshua A. Rash, Victoria A.J. Kavanagh & Sheila N.
Garland, A Meta-Analysis of Mindfulness-Based Therapies for Insomnia and Sleep Disturbance: Moving
Toward Processes of Change, 14 SLEEP MED. CLINICS 209, 209, 224 (2019); Paola Helena Ponte
Márquez, Albert Feliu-Soler, María José Solé-Villa, Laia Matas-Pericas, David Filella-Agullo,
Montserrat Ruiz-Herrerias, Joaquím Soler-Ribaudi, Alex Roca-Cusachs Coll & Juan Antonio ArroyoDíaz, Benefits of Mindfulness Meditation in Reducing Blood Pressure and Stress in Patients with Arterial
Hypertension, 33 J. HUM. HYPERTENSION 237, 237, 244 (2019); Nicola S. Schutte & John M.
Malouff, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of Mindfulness Meditation on Telomerase Activity,
42 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 45, 45 (2014).
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resulting problems, can even outrank the fear of death, which
is, after all, inevitable.
– Harlan Hahn127
Disability discrimination is complex and multi-faceted. The forms of
bias familiar from the study of racism and sexism are present here—
including animus, disgust, irrational stereotyping, and other forms of
irrational as well as economically “rational” bias.128 In some ways, then, this
is familiar terrain, and the wider body of research on race discrimination
applies to disability discrimination. This is good news since, while we have
a long way to go in remedying race discrimination, more research and
thinking has been done in this area, which can be applied to disability
discrimination. In other ways, though, disability discrimination presents
particular dynamics that invite additional tools.
This Part will briefly sketch eight of the central dynamics of disability
discrimination. Some of these points apply more to some disabilities than to
others, since disabilities vary along many dimensions—including, for
instance, whether particular disabilities require workplace accommodations
or involve suffering.129 Nonetheless, the cultural experience of disability has
many common elements.130 This list presents a picture of important features
of disability discrimination, with two central aims: first, to offer a
contribution to the study of disability discrimination and its remedies; and
second, to lay the groundwork for an analysis in the next Part of how
meditation could play some part in addressing these puzzles.
The Sections that follow organize these dynamics under the rubrics of
emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and existential types. Note that, although
the distinction commonly drawn between thinking (cognitive) and feeling
(emotions) is inadequate if not entirely artificial,131 the distinction between
the cognitive and the emotional serves as a useful heuristic to organize and
discuss this vast terrain. These four rubrics will also be used to sort the
127
Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. SOC.
ISSUES 39, 42–43 (1988) (brackets changed to parentheses to clarify that the text of Hahn’s original was
not altered).
128
For a discussion of these categories applied to psychiatric disability, see Elizabeth F. Emens,
The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 406, 409,
414, 418 (2006) [hereinafter Emens, Sympathetic Discriminator].
129
See, e.g., infra Section II.B.2; (referencing the diversity of disabilities in a discussion of “the
spread effect”); Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class
Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 896–98 (2006) (explaining that perceptions of disability’s heterogeneity
frustrate efforts to achieve justice for the class and stymie the application of lessons learned in other
discrimination contexts to disability discrimination).
130
See, e.g., Stein & Watersone, supra note 129, at 897–99, 901 (citing sources and discussing how
a “pandisability theory” would allow “us to once more capture the commonality of class interest”).
131
See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS 1–5 (2001) (arguing for a “cognitive/evaluative theory of emotions” that regards “emotions
as part and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning”).
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mechanisms by which meditation may contribute to debiasing in this sphere.
A chart at the end of Part III brings the dynamics and the mechanisms together.
A. Emotional Dynamics
1. The Quandary of Fear, Rational and Irrational
It is an essential function of a job that a production manager
be able to handle stressful situations (here, requests for
overtime work and routine disagreements) without making
others in the workplace feel threatened for their own safety.132
Fear looms large in responses to disability. The category of fears we
have just been discussing—under the heading of existential anxiety—
involves the fear of one’s susceptibility to becoming disabled, whether
physically or mentally, in ways one is currently not disabled.133
Another category of fears involves concerns about being harmed by the
other person—harmed from without rather than through one’s own
pre-existing vulnerability. For instance, contagion might mean you “catch”
what the other person has. Some forms of contagion are merely imagined—
like fear of “catching” Down Syndrome—and so the fear is just irrational.
By contrast, some disabilities—like HIV—actually are contagious, and so
the fear might have some rational basis. Even then, the contagiousness is often
exaggerated in the public imagination through media and other sources.134
There is also a form of contagion—what psychologists called
“emotional contagion”—whereby we absorb the emotions of nearby others
under certain circumstances. Emotional contagion does not mean that a
disability like depression is literally contagious.135 But some related
132

Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir. 2003).
In principle, existential anxiety of this sort could affect anyone, whether currently disabled or
nondisabled, because no person has every possible disability, so every person could have existential
anxiety about acquiring (new) disabilities. In reality, people who have already “claimed disability” in
their lives in some way have experiential and identity-based reasons to be less generically fearful of the
prospect of acquiring another disability, cf., e.g., SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY; Katie Eyer,
Claiming Disability, 101 BU L. REV. 547 (2021), whereas people who consider themselves nondisabled
may carry a fear of crossing over into what they perceive as “other” and what they assume (mistakenly,
on average) is a far less happy life than life without disability, see infra Section II.A.3 (discussing the
hedonic misforecasting involved in the “disability paradox”).
134
See, e.g., Bagenstos, infra note 171, at 449, 491–95 (discussing stereotypes and stigma
surrounding HIV); Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1467–68, 1468 n.15,
passim (2009) (discussing gaps and double standards surrounding the fears of HIV among Black men
who have sex with men and especially among Black men understood to be living on the “down low”).
135
There is, however, work to suggest that depression itself may be passed, for instance, to
roommates; on closer examination, however, it seems that in some circumstances, the depression is
helped rather than passed along, and gender may be one mediating factor. See, e.g., Daniel Eisenberg,
Ezra Golberstein, Janis L. Whitlock & Marilyn F. Downs, Social Contagion of Mental Health: Evidence
from College Roommates, 22 HEALTH ECON. 965, 973 (2013).
133
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emotions may be passed along; for instance, a short conversation with a
person dealing with clinical depression may lead to absorbing some sadness
or anxiety.136
Emotional contagion sets up challenges for the integration of people
with psychosocial or psychiatric disabilities.137 One such challenge relates
to the finding that emotional contagion is increased when you like someone;
that is, you are more likely to absorb their emotions if you like them better.138
For instance, some research shows that emotional contagion is stronger in
friendship relationships than between mere acquaintances.139 This may mean
that, in the context of emotional contagion, an impulse to discriminate—to
avoid working with someone, for example, by not hiring them—might arise
not so much because you do not like someone as because you do.140 So, in
contrast to our sense, with animus or irrational dislike, that simple contact
through integration will reduce discriminatory impulses, emotional
contagion in the context of psychiatric disability could raise the concern of
an increased impulse to discriminate after more contact.141 This concern
could be alleviated, however, if emotional regulation—for instance, via
meditation—could short-circuit emotional contagion.142
136

See, e.g., James C. Coyne, Depression and the Response of Others, 85 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH.
186, 188–89 (1976) (reporting that “[p]erceived sadness, weakness, discomfort, passivity, and low
mood” in individuals tested via an experiment “were significantly correlated with” the “mood[s]” of the
depressed individuals to whom they spoke). Research on the mechanism is ongoing, but one theory is
that facial mimicry leads listeners to mirror the facial expressions of a speaker, and then—through a
process called afferent feedback—to infer their own emotions from their facial expressions. For
discussion, see, for example, Emens, Sympathetic Discriminator, supra note 128, at 432–34 (citing
sources), and for recent analysis and competing theories, such as those involving social appraisal and
context, see, for example, Monika Wróbel & Kamil K. Imbir, Broadening the Perspective on Emotional
Contagion and Emotional Mimicry: The Correction Hypothesis, 14 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 437, 444–
47 (2019); Ursula Hess & Agneta Fischer, Emotional Mimicry as Social Regulation, 17 PERS. SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 142, 145–46 (2013).
137
The question of terminology is deeply contested throughout disability studies, and perhaps
nowhere more so than in the realm of what are sometimes called psychosocial disabilities, mental illness,
or psychiatric impairment. I move between these terms, on the basis that each has something to offer.
For discussion, see MARGARET PRICE, MAD AT SCHOOL: RHETORICS OF MENTAL DISABILITY AND
ACADEMIC LIFE 17–20 (2011).
138
See, e.g., Hwee Hoon Tan, Maw Der Foo & Min Hui Kwek, The Effects of Customer Personality
Traits on the Display of Positive Emotions, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 287, 292–93 (2004) (finding that “the
trait of agreeableness in customers was positively associated with an increase in the display of positive
emotions by service providers”).
139
See, e.g., Masanori Kimura, Ikuo Daibo & Masao Yogo, The Study of Emotional Contagion
from the Perspective of Interpersonal Relationships, 36 SOCIAL BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 27, 38 (2008);
see also Wróbel & Imbir, supra note 136, at 439–41, 446–47 (discussing research on the role of
friendship and affiliative goals in emotional contagion).
140
Emens, Sympathetic Discriminator, supra note 128, at 401, 429.
141
Id. at 445–47.
142
When I was writing about emotional contagion and the ADA in the past, colleagues would ask
if there were solutions—ways to intercept the emotional contagion by making nearby others less
susceptible to it. I had no answers at the time, but, as the next Part discusses, it now appears that
meditation could be one such tool. See infra Sections III.A.1 & III.A.3.
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Fear also entails the more routine concerns about being physically
injured, directly or indirectly, because of another person’s disability. This
includes fears that people with psychosocial disorders are dangerous,
although the relevant data provide little empirical support for these fears.143
Fear of injury also includes fear that people with physical or mental
disabilities will occupy positions that affect public safety and fail to perform
those jobs well enough. Several of the key cases in the backlash against the
ADA—in which courts interpreted the ADA narrowly despite the statute’s
broad mandate—involve occupations implicating public safety, such as
airline pilots and truck drivers, as other scholars have noted.144
Legal intervention in disability discrimination therefore prompts the
challenging question: What should the public do with their fears? How
should they handle them? Or to personalize it more, how should each of us
(whether currently disabled or “not yet disabled” 145) deal with our fears
related to injury and contagion, real or imagined?
143
See, e.g., Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the “Dangerous Mentally
Ill,” 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 52–53 (2001) (stating that “[c]ontrary to popular belief, current research
demonstrates no more than a ‘weak’ or ‘modest’ association between mental disorders and the risk of
violence”, indicating that “‘public fears are way out of proportion to the empirical reality’”); Patrick W.
Corrigan & David L. Penn, Lessons from Social Psychology on Discrediting Psychiatric Stigma, 54 AM.
PSYCH. 765, 766 (1999) (describing, in an article about dangerousness and other stereotypes associated with
mental illness, that the “[s]tigmas about mental illness seem to be widely endorsed by the general public”
but the “negative stereotypes are not warranted and are overgeneralized”); JOHN WESTON PARRY, MENTAL
DISABILITY, VIOLENCE, AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS: MYTHS BEHIND THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT 1–
12 (2013) (observing that “impressions about future dangerousness” are “unreliable and discriminatory”).
144
See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 493–49 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 525 (1999) Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 577 (1999); see also
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1479, 1479–80 (2001) (providing examples of how “[m]uch…disability based discrimination occurs
because of the discriminator’s fears of safety risk”).
145
The term “not yet disabled” rather than “nondisabled” captures the ways that all of us, whether
or not we currently have a disability, will likely acquire one or more disabilities if we live long enough.
See, e.g., Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do with It or an Introduction to
Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 449–50 (2011) (“[I]t may be said that we
are all ‘temporarily-able-bodied’ or ‘T.A.B.’ because sooner or later most of us will be disabled at some
point in our lives; whether it comes sooner or later varies depending upon one’s circumstances.”);
Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act
Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 332 (2009) (observing that “‘Us’ and
‘Them’ Are Really ‘We’”); Eyer, supra note 133, at 585 (“Thus, many if not most individuals will at
some juncture fall within the ADAAA’s expansive definition of disability. If even some fraction of those
individuals perceived their own self-interest in disability rights—and acted accordingly as movement
participants in politics, or even in everyday life—many of the disability rights movements’ objectives
would become immeasurably more likely.”); see also MICHELLE R. NARIO-REDMOND, ABLEISM: THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DISABILITY PREJUDICE 341 (2020) (discussing the “open enrollment”
aspect of disability and framing disability bias as “a response to unwanted fears of death, the
meaninglessness of life (social death), and the body’s vulnerability to damage and decline” because
disabled people “serve as unwanted reminders of the indefinite frailties of life, and our vulnerability to
decline, dismemberment, and deterioration”); Elizabeth F. Emens, The Art of Access: Innovative Protests
of an Inaccessible City, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1359, 1391 (2020).
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The Americans with Disabilities Act provides a mechanism—the “direct
threat” analysis—that requires an objective inquiry into whether an
individual with a disability “pose[s] a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals in the workplace.”146 But, in practice, this demand for an
objective inquiry can get swallowed up by the fears of those interpreting the
statute, as happened in the Calef case quoted in the epigraph.147 There, in a
case involving a production manager with ADHD,148 the First Circuit never
reached the direct threat analysis, but instead turned the question of
dangerousness into a question of fear. The court decided that it was an
“essential function” of the job of “production manager” to “handle stressful
situations (here, requests for overtime work and routine disagreements)
without making others in the workplace feel threatened for their own
safety.”149 Using this approach, the court determined that the plaintiff, who
had ADHD, failed to make out a prima facie case of being otherwise
qualified for the job.150
Whether or not one agrees with the outcome in that case, one may be
troubled that the court dodged the objective inquiry of the threat required by
the ADA. This dynamic—of fear dictating a legal analysis intended to be
objective—is one challenge facing the implementation of the ADA.
2. Tensions Surrounding the Aesthetic Responses to Disability and the
Contact Hypothesis
The aesthetics of disability trigger affective processes,
however, and some emotions, such as fear or disgust, make it
hard to recognize, respect, adjudicate, and enforce the rights
of people with disabilities.
– Jasmine E. Harris151
The integration presumption and the contact hypothesis—the idea that
contact under certain conditions improves attitudes—have played an
important role in disability law and advocacy. But, as noted earlier, contact
alone is not solving the problem of bias and discrimination.152 Recent work
from Jasmine Harris argues that the advantages of contact are in tension with

146

42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (describing
the requirements for invoking the direct threat defense).
147
See Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 88 (1st Cir. 2003) (Bownes, J., dissenting) (commenting on how
the majority’s reasoning allows fear to enter a determination about whether a person is “otherwise qualified”).
148
ADHD is the acronym for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD): The Basics, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publicati
ons/attention-deficit-hyperactivity-disorder-adhd-the-basics/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
149
Calef, 322 F.3d at 86.
150
Id. at 86–87.
151
Harris, supra note 29, at 897 (footnote omitted).
152
See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
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the potential disadvantages of contact for disability rights.153 Earlier writings
by Harlan Hahn had identified an “aesthetic anxiety” in responses to
disability—that is, “the fears engendered by persons whose appearance
deviates markedly from the usual human form or includes physical traits
regarded as unappealing”154—but legal scholarship had not reckoned with
the aesthetic dimension of disability bias until Harris published “The
Aesthetics of Disability” in 2019.155 In Harris’s words, “[c]ontact triggers
aesthetic-affective responses to disability that make it hard for nondisabled
people—unaccustomed to the broad spectrum of capabilities of people with
disabilities—to overcome deeply rooted and seemingly intuitive aesthetic
judgments.”156 She argues that scholars have focused on the cognitive
dimensions of changing stereotypes, but neglected the emotional and
aesthetic responses to disability, which are “sticky norms” that are hindering
the ameliorative effects of contact.157
3. Misperceptions of Suffering
It is remarkable but true that paraplegics are only modestly
less happy than other people . . . . Young people who have lost
a limb as a result of cancer show no less happiness than
similarly situated young people who have not had cancer.
Moderately disabled people recover to their predisability level
after 2 years. Kidney dialysis patients do not show lower levels
of happiness than ordinary people. Colostomy patients report
levels of happiness that are about the same as people who have
not had colostomies. . . .
From this evidence, it is fair to conclude that healthy people
systematically overestimate the adverse effects of many
physical problems. . . .
Just as people overestimate the hedonic harm of many
physical losses, such as kidney dialysis and colostomies, so too

153

Harris, supra note 29, at 895.
Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. SOC.
ISSUES 39, 42 (1988).
155
Harris, supra note 29.
156
Id. at 931.
157
Id. at 940 (citation omitted).
154
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people underestimate the hedonic effect of adverse effects,
such as depression and chronic pain.
– Cass R. Sunstein158
Outsiders to disabilities often misperceive the suffering involved.159
Well-known to researchers in the field of hedonics is a phenomenon called
the disability paradox, reflected in the first paragraph of the epigraph above.
People significantly overestimate the suffering they would experience if they
had a physical disability that they do not currently have⎯even something as
serious as paraplegia.160
In other words, someone without paraplegia is likely to estimate that his
life would be far worse with paraplegia; yet people who develop paraplegia
report little to no reduction in happiness after an initial period of adjustment.
The same goes for people who start dialysis to support kidney dysfunction,
for example, and for people with a range of other disabilities.161
This is a misperception of suffering. Interestingly, though, not all
disabilities are misperceived in the same direction. For a few impairments,
including depression and chronic pain, outsiders tend to underestimate the
158

Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157, S165–67 (2008) (citations omitted).
For critiques of these studies of hedonics, see, for example, Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and
Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE L.J. 1509, 1542–44 (2013); W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits of
Mortality Risk Reduction: Happiness Surveys vs. The Value of a Statistical Life, 62 DUKE L.J. 1735,
1737 (2013).
159
See Anne Bloom & Paul Steven Miller, Blindsight: How We See Disabilities in Tort Litigation
86 WASH. L. REV. 709, 712–13 (2011) (critiquing “[t]ort litigation’s blindsight”, namely, its
“assumption that the lives of people with disabilities are tragic”); John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 1516, 1536 n. 106 (2008) (writing “[w]hen awarding compensation for hedonic damages, jurors
tend to focus inordinately on the limiting effects of a disability and, as ostensibly healthy people, fail to
recognize how well most disabled people adapt”); Richard A. Epstein, Happiness and Revealed
Preferences in Evolutionary Perspective, 33 VT. L. REV. 559, 563–64 (2009) (writing “[t]he hedonic
losses that loom large to the outsider are always smaller than they appear”); Cortney E. Lollar, Punitive
Compensation, 51 TULSA L. REV. 99, 130–31 (2015) (writing that juries engage in inaccurate “emotional
forecasting” because of a tendency “to realize that the intensity and duration of a difficult emotional
experience will be less than our intuition or belief tells us”)
160
See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel, George Loewenstein, Norbert Schwarz & Dylan Smith, Misimagining
the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCH. S57,
S57 (2005) (finding that “healthy people also mispredict the emotional impact that chronic illness and
disability will have on their lives”); Philip Brickman, Dan Coates & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery
Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 917, 917
(1978) (finding that happiness levels, after a period of adaptation, were similar between accident victims
and lottery winners). But cf. Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A
Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1061,
1072 (2008) (estimating the degree of hedonic adaptation after disability to be approximately 30% to 50%).
161
See, e.g., Jason Riis, George Loewenstein, Jonathan Baron & Christopher Jepson, Ignorance of
Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 3, 3 (2005) (concluding, from a study following a study comparing
hemodialysis patients to healthy non-patients, that “healthy people fail to anticipate hedonic adaptation
to poor health”).
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suffering involved.162 That is, people without depression or chronic pain
typically imagine the suffering involved in those impairments to be less than
what is reported by those actually experiencing the conditions.
Though they point in opposite directions, both misperceptions—the
assumption of greater suffering and lesser suffering—are gaps in emotional
understanding. They are part of a social distance, a lack of felt connection,
between people who are disabled and those who are not, along a particular
dimension of ability. People with psychiatric impairments, along with other
invisible disabilities, often report being disbelieved; imagine being in
incredible pain but having others believe you are doing just fine. 163 People
with physical disabilities often report feeling pitied when their lives include
richly satisfying elements and when the challenges of life are often created
by the social distance and lack of accommodations of a world that treats
them as “other.”164 These misperceptions of suffering lie on the cusp
between emotional dynamics and cognitive dynamics, the next subject.
B. Cognitive Dynamics
1. Integrating People with Disabilities Requires a Practice of Seeing
Disability
Indeed, contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’s declaration of
colorblindness that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race” is Justice
Ginsburg’s pronouncement that inclusion under the ADA “would

162

See, e.g., Edie Greene, Kristin A. Sturm & Andrew J. Evelo, Affective Forecasting About
Hedonic Loss and Adaptation: Implications for Damage Awards, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 244, 245–46,
252–54 (2016); Sunstein, Illusory Losses, supra note 158, at S167.
163
See, e.g., Susan Stefan, “Discredited” and “Discreditable”: The Search for Political Identity
by People with Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 WM. MARY L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2003) (“In the absence of
unmistakable problems in social functioning, an individual’s self-report of psychiatric disability is likely
to be discredited, disbelieved, or minimized.”); TONI BERNHARD, HOW TO BE SICK: A BUDDHIST-INSPIRED
GUIDE FOR THE CHRONICALLY ILL AND THEIR LOVED ONES 12 (“Everyone I saw at work assumed I’d
fully recovered. After all, I didn’t look sick to them.”). Cf., e.g., Liz Crow, Including All of Our Lives:
Renewing the Social Model of Disability, in ENCOUNTERS WITH STRANGERS: FEMINISM AND DISABILITY
206–210 (Jenny Morris ed., 1996) (“The experience of impairment is not always irrelevant, neutral or
positive. How can it be when it is the very reason used to justify the oppression we are battling against?
How can it be when pain, fatigue, depression and chronic illness are constant facts of life for many of us?”).
164
See, e.g., Harriet McBryde Johnson, Unspeakable Conversations, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/magazine/unspeakable-conversations.html (“Are we
‘worse off’? I don't think so. Not in any meaningful sense. There are too many variables. For those of us
with congenital conditions, disability shapes all we are. Those disabled later in life adapt. We take
constraints that no one would choose and build rich and satisfying lives within them. We enjoy pleasures
other people enjoy, and pleasures peculiarly our own. We have something the world needs.”).

2022]

MINDFUL DEBIASING

869

sometimes require not blindfolded equality, but responsiveness
to difference; not indifference, but accommodation.”
– Kimani Paul-Emile165
Colorblindness is a common metaphor for our race discrimination
jurisprudence. Trenchant critiques have been offered of the idea that, as
rendered by Chief Justice Roberts, “the way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”166 In the context
of disability, the “blindness” metaphors are multiply problematic. For
starters, applying the metaphor of blindness to the disability context
highlights its shortcomings—as is often the case with metaphors of
disability167—since no one means in invoking colorblindness that people
literally cannot see race.168
Rather, the entire structure of disability law requires seeing disability.
This is true in two main ways. First, disability-based protections depend on
165

Paul-Emile, supra note 39, at 354 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 536 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
166
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. Critiques of colorblindness include, among many others, Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); David A. Strauss,
The Myth of Colorblindness, SUP. CT. REV. 99–134 (1986); Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color-Blind
Constitution 54 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 157 (1998); Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of
Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253 (2011); Matthew J.
Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 87
(2006); Mary Kathryn Nagle, Parents Involved and the Myth of the Colorblind Constitution, 26 HARV.
J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 211, 215 (2010); Uma M. Jayakumar and Annie S. Adamian, The Fifth Frame
of Colorblind Ideology: Maintaining the Comforts of Colorblindness in the Context of White Fragility,
60(5) SOCIOL. PERSPECT. 912 (2017); Benjamin Eidelson, Respect, Individualism, and Colorblindness,
129 YALE L.J. 1600 (2020).
167
Liz Bowen, Learning to Read Ecologically: Disability, Animality, and Metaphor in Toni
Morrison’s A Mercy, 88 ENG. LIT. HIST. 527 (2021) (“In disability studies, disability-as-metaphor has
long been viewed as one of the bedrocks of casual ableism . . . .”); Christopher Shinn, Disability Is Not
Just a Metaphor, ATLANTIC (July 23, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/201
4/07/why-disabled-characters-are-never-played-by-disabled-actors/374822/ (observing that ‘[p]op
culture’s more interested in disability as a metaphor than in disability as something that happens to real
people”). On the question more generally of whether metaphors involving disability are always
problematic, see, for example, Elizabeth F. Emens, What’s Left in Her Wake: A Tribute to Adrienne Asch,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Feb. 2014, at 20 [hereinafter Emens, What’s Left in Her Wake]; Bowen, supra, at
528 (“In short, while disability and animal metaphors and their attendant critical interpretations tend to
subordinate atypical/nonhuman bodies to their figurative meanings, A Mercy shows that bodies don’t
have to cease being bodies when they become figures.”); see also Disability as Metaphor, HASTINGS
CTR. (June 17, 2021), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/news/disability-as-metaphor/ (discussing
Liz Bowen’s work on how disability metaphors can “reinforce damaging associations between disability
and undesirable states of being like confusion, suffering, and ignorance” but how “there may still be a
use for disability metaphors if we’re willing to invest in new ones”).
168
See, e.g., Destiny Peery, The Colorblind Ideal in a Race-Conscious Reality: The Case for a New
Legal Ideal for Race Relations, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL. 473, 484 (“People are not, after all, colorblind
and wishing that were the case does not make it so.”); cf. Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 404, 409 (2012) (describing the “judiciary’s mottled practice of racial recognition”).
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determinations of whether someone is in the protected class of persons with
disabilities. The ADA, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) are not symmetrical; they do not protect
everyone along the axis of ability. Instead, they protect a subset of the
population that qualifies as disabled, according to the statutory definition.169
Courts, employers, landlords, and school administrators therefore must
know whether someone is disabled within the meaning of the relevant statute
to know whether someone is protected.
Second, disability-based protections generally involve accommodation
requirements.170 Accommodation requires recognizing disability and
perceiving how it operates in interaction with the environment.
Neither of these forms of “seeing” disability is likely to be an isolated
event. Instead, accommodations need to be adjusted as disabilities and
contexts change. So, disability law requires a practice of repeatedly
perceiving a person’s impairment in interaction with the environment. These
small moments accrete to a larger practice of paying attention to disability.
This runs contrary to a central idea governing antidiscrimination thinking in
U.S. law and norms: the notion of individual “good actors” who have
crossed the finish line toward nondiscrimination and never have to think
about a protected category again.
2. Tension Between the “Spread Effect” and the Failure to Recognize
Disability as a Class
Individuals with physical and mental impairments frequently
experience a “spread effect,” in which people assume that an
impairment that affects particular life functions also indicates
a more general disability. Thus, “[p]eople with disabilities
often report that people will raise their voice to speak to
someone in a wheelchair, or who is blind—even though there
is no obvious reason for doing so.”
– Samuel R. Bagenstos171
A typical outsider mistake is to treat a person with one disability as if
she has some other unrelated disability. Speaking loudly to a person who is
169

See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (for the definition of “disability” under the ADA); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(h)
(for the definition of “handicap” under the Fair Housing Act); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A) (for the
definition of “child with a disability” under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
170
See ADA of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213; FHA of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31; IDEA of
1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82.
171
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV 397, 423–24
(2000) (quoting Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS.
L. REV. 1237, 1308 and citing, inter alia, U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 25 (1983)).
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blind as if she were also deaf, or speaking slowly to someone in a wheelchair
as if he were cognitively impaired—these are classic examples of what is
called the spread effect.172
What spurs the spread effect is not clearly understood. But one plausible
theory draws on Erving Goffman’s work on stigma. Goffman argued that
people with certain traits are “discredited” by society; members of these
stigmatized groups may be seen as so outside the favored community as to
be not quite human.173 Relegation to a class of stigmatized people is an
imprecise operation, which may involve blurring the distinctions between
particular impairments. Outsiders may thus leap to the assumption that
having one impairment means having another. Other research suggests that
people of higher status tend to notice and know less about people of lower
status—they are less perceptive and observant of their realities—than is true
in reverse.174 This dimension of status differentials in awareness and
attention to detail may also contribute.
The spread effect is problematic for obvious reasons: This stereotyping
leads to individuals with disabilities being misperceived and viewed as less
capable than they actually are. Moreover, the spread effect is part of a
troubling dynamic whereby the imaginative blurring of disabilities does not
seem to work for persons with disabilities, only against them. When disabled
plaintiffs try to bring a class action antidiscrimination lawsuit, courts
172
See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 171 (defining the “spread effect” as consisting of “overbroad
generalizations about the limiting effects of [disabled individuals’] impairments” and writing that such
“stereotypes…contribute substantially to the systematic disadvantage experienced by people with
disabilities”); Samuel Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and
Disability 60 VANDERBILT L. REV. 745, 779 (2007) (using the “spread effect” as an example of social
circumstances that deprive people with specific disabilities of opportunities); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 25 (1983) (“Some
nonhandicapped people believe that disabled people differ from others in many respects beyond their
specific disabilities. Generalizing from an impairment to the whole person has been termed the ‘spread
effect.’”). For the authors often credited with first using the term “spread” for this effect, see Tamara
Dembo, Gloria Ladieu & Beatrice A. Wright, Adjustment to Misfortune—A Problem of SocialPsychological Rehabilitation, 3 ARTIFICIAL LIMBS 1956, at 26 (republished as Tamara Dembo, Gloria
Ladieu Leviton & Beatrice A. Wright, Adjustment to Misfortune: A Problem of Social-Psychological
Rehabilitation, 22 REHAB. PSYCH. 1975) (writing that the “[s]pread or the exaggeration of negative
effects of an injury, may provide the noninjured with an excellent reason for excluding the injured from
participation in activities”); see also BEATRICE A. WRIGHT, PHYSICAL DISABILITY—A PSYCHOSOCIAL
APPROACH 32–36 (2d ed. 1983) (exploring the meaning and origin of various forms of the spread effect).
173
See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY, 10–
12 (1986) (discussing how stigmatized attributes serve to discredit the holder of those attributes); see
also Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 117
YALE L.J. 992, 1053–57 (2008) (discussing the relevance of “[s]tigmatized impairments,” which given
the spread effect “tend to be regarded as more limiting than they in fact are,” to a particular doctrinal
quandary under the ADA of 1990); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality
in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (2004) (articulating an important stigma-based theory of discrimination).
174
See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, Rich People Just Care Less, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013, 2:25 PM),
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/05/rich-people-just-care-less/ (discussing the public
policy implications of the research finding “that people with the most social power pay scant attention to
those with little such power”).
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frequently conclude that people with disabilities lack sufficient typicality to
form a class.175 Internal diversity of groups can impair litigation efforts in
other areas, such as race discrimination, as Crenshaw and others have
described.176 But in the context of disability, the diversity internal to the
category seems to defy recognition of any legally cognizable group at all—
despite the spread effect that blurs disabilities in individual interactions
across various types of disabilities.
3. The Neglect of Benefits—of Accommodation and of Disability
What the ADA does not remedy—and indeed may even
aggravate—is the problem of neglected benefits. By this I
mean that courts and agencies frequently fail to notice the
benefits of disability accommodation—beyond those to the
individual for whom they were designed. Accommodations can
have many and varied benefits to third parties . . . and yet those
entities that oversee the implementation of the ADA neglect to
include such benefits in their analyses.
– Elizabeth F. Emens177
The last several points culminate in another problematic dynamic.
Disability law requires paying attention to disability, but the costs of
disability are typically most salient. Benefits⎯of accommodation or of
disability⎯are neglected by legal and social actors alike.
Disability accommodations can spur innovation and create a range of
benefits for individuals beyond the particular individual for whom the
accommodation is designed. Think of curb cuts, which benefit those with
wheeled suitcases, strollers, and bikes, as well as those who travel on wheels.
Or of closed captions for hearing-impaired individuals, which are now used
in noisy airports and gymnasiums. In the workplace, voice-to-text software
and ergonomic furniture are just two examples of the many that have been
described elsewhere.178

175

See, e.g., Stein & Waterstone, supra note 129, at 883–86 (observing that courts’ “denials of class
certification” to disabled plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases have been largely “predicated on
the notion that the remedies granted, if any, were based on individualized inquiry into disability and the
accommodation needed, and thus lacked typicality”).
176
See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 166.
177
Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 867 (2008).
178
Id. at 870–72, 884, 907, 916; Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:
Americans with Disabilities Act Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 642–
43 (2004) (“[T]echnological developments that originally were developed to assist people with
disabilities but which have become useful to the general population . . . include the telephone, the
typewriter, the Jacuzzi, and closed-captioning.”).
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Nonetheless, employers, administrators, and other decisionmakers tend
to overlook these and other benefits of disability in conducting the costbenefit analyses that are required or spurred by law and policy. For instance,
in the workplace, court interpretations of the ADA require balancing costs
and benefits to determine the “reasonableness” of proposed
accommodations, as well as whether accommodations pose an “undue
hardship,” but courts have discussed third-party costs without even
mentioning the possibility of third-party benefits.179 And under the IDEA,
courts neglect the potential benefits a disabled child may bring to the
classroom, viewing the transfer of benefits to go only one way.180 The way
people commonly think about disability as so profoundly and universally
negative seems to limit courts’ capacity to see the potential benefits of
accommodation and of disability to the integrated setting.181
A parallel phenomenon may be operating in the tendency of institutional
diversity initiatives to leave disability out. Disability is understood more in
terms of compliance with regulatory requirements, rather than as a category
ripe for improving the workplace culture through integration.182 Again,
decisionmakers are neglecting the potential for benefits.
C. Behavioral Dynamics
1. Legal and Social Demands for Explicit Dialogue within a Culture
of Silencing
The peculiar drama of my life has placed me in a world that
by and large thinks it would be better if people like me did not

179

Emens, supra note 177, at 869–72.
See, e.g., Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1400–01 (9th
Cir. 1994); Yaron Covo, Reversing Reverse Mainstreaming, 75 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023)
(documenting how legal decisionmakers have systematically upheld educational practices that are built
on the premise that disabled students benefit from exposure to nondisabled peers, without recognizing
the ways in which disabled students and disability culture may benefit nondisabled students).
181
The focus on the costs of disability and accommodation likely contributes to the perspective of
those who read the ADA’s Title I as doing something wholly different from Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, despite the overlap (which Christine Jolls and Michael Stein have so deftly demonstrated).
See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 666–68 (2001);
Stein, supra note 178, at 636–38.
182
See, e.g., Lauren Shallish, “Just How Much Diversity Will the Law Permit?”: The Americans
with Disabilities Act, Diversity, and Disability in Higher Education, Vol. 35 DISABILITY STUD. Q., No.
3 (2015) (discussing how discourse surrounding disability of university campuses centers on legal
compliance rather than on diversity, equity, and inclusion); Lennard Davis, Why Is Disability Missing
from the Discourse on Diversity?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 25, 2011), https://www.chronicle.co
m/article/why-is-disability-missing-from-the-discourse-on-diversity/ (writing that “colleges rarely
think of disability when they tout diversity”); Emens, Disabling Attitudes, supra note 20, at 228 (arguing
that “the persistence of a clear hierarchy of nondisabled over disabled also contributes to the frequent
omission of disability from corporate and academic ‘diversity’ initiatives”)
180
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exist. My fight has been for accommodation, the world to me
and me to the world.
– Harriet McBryde Johnson183
Not only do law and policy require perceiving disability; they also
require talking about disability. And yet, in this culture, social norms
discourage speaking about disability—even deeming it a shameful topic to
be avoided. Disability scholars and other writers describe the way children
are shushed by their parents when they try to ask questions about
disability.184 The message conveyed by such silencing of a child’s curiosity
is that talking about disability is wrong, even shameful, in some way.
This culture of silence surrounding disability runs headlong into the
demands of the law: for instance, under the ADA, of an “interactive process”
around disability accommodations in the workplace;185 and, under the IDEA,
of meetings of parents with teachers, administrators, therapists, and others
to devise Individual Education Programs for children with disabilities.186
Conversations about disability may also be necessary in social settings, for
instance, to facilitate access to a private home for someone who uses a
wheelchair, given how often private homes lack basic accessibility features.187
One reason that, in contrast to the curiosity of children, nondisabled
adults are often reluctant to talk about disability is they may well get things
wrong. This brings us to the next dynamic.188
2. The Irony Attempts to Do Right by Disability
Nondisabled individuals may actually be perceived by
disabled people, therefore, as expressing negative attitudes
when, in fact, the nondisabled persons are trying hard to
express what they consider to be positive attitudes. . . . Thus

183

Harriet McBryde Johnson, Unspeakable Conversations, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2003).
See, e.g., Tollifson, supra note 56, at 105–06 (“I’m missing my right hand and half of my right
arm. . . . People swallow their curiosity and conceal their discomfort . . . . One of the central memories
of my childhood is of children asking me what happened to my arm and the adults instantly silencing
them: ‘ssshhhhhhh!’ Taboo.”); SIMI LINTON, MY BODY POLITIC 29–30 (2007).
185
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1991); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, Notice No. 915.002, (Oct. 17, 2002).
186
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2016).
187
The so-called “visitability movement” advocates for basic features of accessibility in private
homes. See, e.g., Visitability, NAT’L COUNCIL ON INDEP. LIVING, http://www.visitability.org (last visited
Feb. 14, 2021); accord Jordana L. Maisel, Eleanor Smith & Edward Steinfeld, Increasing Home
Access: Designing for Visitability, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (2008), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter
/il/2008_14_access.pdf; Emens, Intimate Discrimination, supra note 88, at 1394–96.
188
Another example of how outsiders get disabilities wrong arises in the earlier Section on the
misperception of suffering. See supra Section II.A.3.
184
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the paradox of well-intentioned liberalism is that the recipient
frequently experiences the interaction as offensive.
– Elaine Makas189
Perhaps even more remarkable is this final dynamic: nondisabled people
often get it more wrong when they are trying to get it right around disability.
In a fascinating study of attitudes to disability, Elaine Makas compared a
general sample of nondisabled people with a group of nondisabled people
identified as having “good attitudes” towards disability by their disabled
peers.190 Subjects reported their attitudes to disability in general and under
“fake well” conditions. (The fake-well condition was created by telling them
to answer as if they were entering a contest with a prize for the most
disability-positive answers.) Makas also asked disabled respondents the
same questions to find out what attitudes they deemed positive.
What was most striking was that the general pool of nondisabled people
sometimes did worse in the fake-well condition.191 When they were trying
to impress someone with their positive attitudes to disability, these
nondisabled people demonstrated less positive attitudes—by the lights of the
disabled participants. For example, in the fake-well condition, these
nondisabled subjects were even more inclined to favor attitudes that Makas
calls “Give the Disabled Person a Break” (such as agreeing with the
statement, “Generally, it’s a good idea not to try to win a game when
competing with a physically disabled person”) and the “Disabled Saint”
perspective (such as agreeing with the statement, “Disabled people are
generally easier to get along with than nondisabled people”).192
This suggests that we need something more than good intentions.
Though reasonable minds could disagree about the best attitudes toward
disability, it is significant that nondisabled people’s answers got further from
the responses that disabled individuals, on average, thought were best on
multiple items. Making an effort to get it right is not enough and, without
more, may even be counterproductive.
D. Existential Dynamics
1. Existential Anxiety in the Face of Universal Vulnerability
[V]ulnerability is—and should be understood to be—universal
and constant, inherent in the human condition. . . . Our
embodied humanity carries with it the ever-constant

189

Makas, supra note 99, at 58.
Id. at 53–54.
191
Id. at 54–55.
192
Id. at 55.
190
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possibility of dependency as a result of disease, epidemics,
resistant viruses, or other biologically-based catastrophes.
– Martha Albertson Fineman193
We all could become disabled, in an instant or a few long months, in
ways that we are not currently. If we are able-bodied, a car accident could
change that in a moment. If we are able-minded, a traumatic event could
leave us with flashbacks. And more mundane events, or non-events, could
form the transition into living with disabilities that we do not presently have.
More generally, all of us who are lucky enough to live that long will
eventually acquire disabilities new to us—hence some nondisabled people’s
embrace of the identity “not yet disabled.”194 No one lives entirely apart from
disability; vulnerability is universal.
Given our common vulnerability, why is disability law not widely
understood as a social insurance policy for everyone? Why does everyone
not feel a profound stake in building a deep and welcoming integration of
people with disabilities into the mainstream of workplaces and homes and
public and private institutions of every sort? If everyone could potentially
benefit from that integration sooner or later, in concrete and obvious ways
as disabled persons, then why does everyone not readily support disability
rights and integration?195
This is a puzzle. It is a puzzle with implications for important questions
in law and policy, as well as our individual interactions. This question of
course intersects with the question of who is a discrete and insular minority,
following footnote 4 of Carolene Products,196 and John Hart Ely, who
suggested that people with disabilities should not need heightened
constitutional protection because they should be able to secure empathy
from others because of commonalities of circumstance.197 These
commonalities may well have helped get the Americans with Disabilities
Act passed, but they were not enough to get the statute implemented
193

Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1, 9 (2008).
194
See, e.g., supra note 145 (citing sources) and accompanying text.
195
The argument that nondisabled people should support disability rights out of self-interest, rather
than moral imperative, has been critiqued in important ways, which are beyond the scope of this Article.
For discussion, see Emens, Integrating Accommodation, supra note 177, at 916–19.
196
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 500–03 (2004) (explaining the evolution of
the term “discrete and insular minorities” through our jurisprudence).
197
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 150 (1980)
(suggesting that people in general, including “elected officials,” are likely “to feel sorry for a person
disabled by something he or she can’t do anything about”). For a response to Ely’s characterization of
disability as meriting pity, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Against Nature, 52 NOMOS 293, 322 (2012) (noting
the pervasiveness in the legal scholarship of the hasty “assumption” that disability is “an unappealing
category that one necessarily wants out of” and that one would “cure” if one had the choice).
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effectively; instead, the law met backlash in the courts.
These
commonalities may also have helped the passage of the ADA Amendments
Act (ADAAA), but they have not been enough to increase employment for
people with disabilities, even with the ADAAA in place. Instead,
employment rates for people with disabilities have remained stable and, by
some measures, even dropped.199
This puzzle is one that disability scholars have long been studying. A
core concept emerging from that work is existential anxiety. This term,
coined by Harlan Hahn, quoted in an earlier epigraph,200 refers to the anxiety
sparked by the presence of a disabled person because, for the outsider who
does not have that disability, the disabled person represents “the threat of
potential loss of functional capabilities by the nondisabled.”201 Existential
anxiety, as conceived by Hahn, is typically unconscious, but Hahn’s account
of the internal monologue that represents its conscious form limns the
underlying logic: “[T]here, but for the grace of God (or luck or fate or other
fundamental beliefs), go I” and “I would rather be dead than live as a
paraplegic (or as blind, deaf, or immobilized).”202 This notion of “better dead
than disabled” effectively captures the stakes of the anxiety that disabled
people may spark in people without that disability.203
The impact of this may be social distancing and the negative attitudes to
disability documented in the empirical literature.204 It may also fuel the
“selective sympathy and indifference” that helps us understand why markets
198

See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 19, at 844–48.
See, e.g., Jennifer Bennett Shinall, The Substantially Impaired Sex: Uncovering the Gendered
Nature of Disability Discrimination, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1111 n.56 (2017) (citing sources);
Bagenstos, supra note 171, at 455–56.
200
See Hahn, supra note 127 and accompanying text.
201
Id. at 42.
202
Id.
203
This overlaps also with psychodynamic theories of prejudice and the idea that dominant groups
distance themselves from what they most dislike or feel ashamed of in themselves by locating it on other
groups; for instance, Delgado et al. write,
199

Some theorists assert that the differences most disliked by the prejudiced person are
those he unconsciously recognizes as potential characteristics of himself. This is
particularly true of “sins of the flesh”—lechery, laziness, aggression and slovenliness,
traits prejudiced individuals often ascribe to the Black. Similarly, the sins of pride,
deceit, unsocialized egotism and grasping ambition are often ascribed to the Jew. The
traits ascribed to blacks reflect our “id” impulses; the traits ascribed to Jews, violations
of our “superego,” or conscience. Thus, “our accusations and feelings of revulsion
against both groups symbolize our dissatisfaction with the evil in our own nature.”
Delgado et al., supra note 25, at 1377 (citing ALLPORT, supra note 25, at 199; LEONARD BERKOWITZ,
AGGRESSION: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 142, 145–47 (1962); John Harding, Harold
Proshansky, Bernard Kutner & Isidor Chein, Prejudice and Ethnic Relations, in 5 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 35 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1969); T.W. ADORNO, ELSE
FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, DANIEL J. LEVINSON & R. NEVITT SANFORD, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
(1969); NATHAN W. ACKERMAN & MARIE JAHODA, ANTI-SEMITISM AND EMOTIONAL DISORDER: A
PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION (1950)).
204
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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will not simply stop disability discrimination on their own even if many
disability accommodations are cost-justified.205 Selective sympathy is a term
to describe the way that employers and others may inadvertently disfavor
employees with disabilities, in the absence of a disability accommodation
requirement, by granting special requests for nondisabled employees (say,
to leave early for a child’s sports event) while refusing to grant the requests
of disabled employees related to a disability (say, to leave early for therapy).
Feeling distance and anxiety, rather than kinship and connection, around the
fact of vulnerability may support such differential identification.
The epigraph from Martha Fineman, like the earlier one from Harlan
Hahn, emphasizes anxiety about physical disability—through words like
“embodied” and “biologically based.”206 Fear of our vulnerable minds,
however, is possibly even more intense than fear of our vulnerable bodies,
as Sander Gilman has argued. In Gilman’s words,
[T]he most elementally frightening possibility is the loss of
control over the self, and loss of control is associated with loss
of language and thought perhaps even more than with physical
illness. Often associated with violence (including aggressive
sexual acts), the mad are perceived as the antitheses to the
control and reason that define the self. Again, what is
perceived is in large part a projection: for within everyone’s
fantasy life there exists . . . an incipient madness that we
control with more or less success.207
This fear of the madness within, according to Michael Perlin, fuels the
“sanism” so prevalent in our society.208 (To take in one measure of sanism,
think of how often the epithet “crazy” is used, when few people would think
of using parallel epithets for race or even for physical disability. 209) Sanism,
205
Cf. Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination, supra note 27, at 853–54 (explaining “selective
sympathy and indifference” as “when the decisionmaker would not engage in the same action, however
rational, were the racial identity of the disadvantaged class different. This holds true whether or not the
decisionmaker knows that he is being racially selective”); Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop
Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22, 29 (1991) (arguing that, even in the absence of employer
animus, discrimination may persist in free markets); Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of
Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 88, 108–09 (2003) (dividing accommodations into
categories based on the production of “hard” and “soft” net costs and benefits); Helen A. Schartz, D.J.
Hendricks & Peter Blanck, Workplace Accommodations: Evidence Based Outcomes, 27 WORK 345, 348
(2006) (finding in a study of employers that contacted the Job Accommodation Network about
accommodations that in almost half of the cases “employers reported that there was zero direct cost
associated with the accommodation”).
206
See supra text accompanying note 193.
207
SANDER L. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE, AND
MADNESS 23–24 (1985).
208
Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 373 (1992).
209
E.g., Rachel Ewing, “That’s Crazy”: Why You Might Want to Rethink That Word in Your
Vocabulary, PENN. MED. NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018), Error!
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in this understanding, operates much like homophobia, in that a fear of one’s
own vulnerability spurs a resistance to a person who represents that
vulnerability.210 The analogy to homophobia may also be helpful in
understanding existential anxiety more generally.
Existential anxiety is typically understood in terms of nondisabled
people’s reactions to disability. But this dynamic may also underpin the
reluctance of some people with disabilities to identify as disabled. The
ethicist Adrienne Asch was particularly interested in the problem of this disidentification, because, inter alia, the coalition of disabled people would be
huge were everyone to show up for it.211 She wanted work in disability
studies “to emphasize the ‘95 percent’ of people with disabilities whose
impairments were ‘nonstatic,’ ‘intermittent,’ and ‘associated with disease’
or ‘age’—impairments like diabetes, hypertension, emphysema, and back
problems.”212 As Katie Eyer has importantly argued, elaborating and
theorizing this theme of “claiming disability,” given that at least 25% of
people have disabilities,213 that is a big tent.214 And yet that coalition is
elusive—and people without disabilities often keep their distance from
disabled folks—leaving everyone with less of a safety net surrounding our
universal human vulnerability.
***
The epigraph at the start of this Part not only explains the particular
phenomenon of existential anxiety; Hahn’s words also illuminate the
complex interplay of conscious and unconscious beliefs and fears that
contribute to the social distance nondisabled people often create around
people with disabilities. The classic formulation he invokes—“I would
rather be dead than [disabled]”—points us toward a fundamental resistance
embedded in the response to disability: our desperate struggle to un-know
some basic realities of life, change, and death.215 As Hahn writes, facing
valid.https://www.pennmedicine.org/news/news-blog/2018/september/that-crazy-why-you-mightwant-to-rethink-that-word-in-your-vocabulary.
210
Perlin, supra note 208, at 388–98.
211
Emens, What’s Left in Her Wake, supra note 167, at 20.
212
Id.
213
Okoro et al., supra note 1515.
214
Eyer, Claiming Disability, supra note 133, at 564–65. Eyer measures the prevalence of
“impairment,” as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2020), in American society at meaningfully higher rates:
Impairment is ubiquitous in our society. 60% of American adults have a chronic
physical or mental condition, such as diabetes, heart disease, or depression. 42% have
multiple chronic conditions. Approximately 46% of Americans will experience
mental illness in their lifetime, 38% will experience cancer, and 40% will experience
diabetes. Mobility, hearing, vision, and cognition impairments all affect significant
numbers of American adults. By the numbers, those with impairments are no minority
but are likely the majority of the American population.
Id. (sources omitted).
215
Hahn, supra note 127, at 43.
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those facts, “[i]n fact, the threat of a permanent and debilitating disability,
with its resulting problems, can even outrank the fear of death, which is,
after all, inevitable.”216 An enhanced capacity for facing the inevitable is a
fundamental part of what meditation offers us, in life and in debiasing. This
brings us to our discussion of the possible mechanisms by which meditation
may help to combat discrimination.
III. MECHANISMS OF DEBIASING
Adrienne [Asch] spoke in recent years about writing a book
based on interviews with nondisabled people who “get it” with
regard to disability. . . . Over the years, she gave glimpses into
what she thought prepared a nondisabled person to get it:
Such a person has to be comfortable enough not knowing all
the answers and not being in control at all times. A person who
gets it responds to his own confusion or ignorance about the
ways of a disabled person by thinking, “I don’t actually know
how X is going to do Y, but I’ll take his word for it that he can
and see what happens.” A person who gets it, as Adrienne
portrayed him or her, is inclined to “see life as an adventure.”
– What’s Left in Her Wake: In Honor of Adrienne Asch217
If meditation does decrease bias, why might that be? What might be the
mechanism for debiasing? This Section draws on research and writing in
disability studies and mindfulness studies to identify the most promising
mechanisms. Though the extant literature points to some possible mechanisms,
we are far from zeroing in on any one driver. This Part is therefore
exploratory and experimental, inviting the reader to imagine and to test out
the possibilities offered, for their fit with reason and experience, throughout.
The mechanisms are again organized under the rubrics of Emotional,
Cognitive, Behavioral, and Existential. As noted earlier, the distinctions
between these categories—particularly between cognitive and emotional—
are somewhat artificial, as these mechanisms often operate at the
intersection.218 But the rubrics are nonetheless helpful to create order out of
complexity, an effort further supported by a chart at the end of this Part
showing connections between the dynamics and the mechanisms. The
typology of possible mechanisms herein lays the groundwork for an
examination of the implications for law and society in Part IV.

216

Id.; see infra note 288 (quoting Tollifson on death and disability).
Emens, What’s Left in Her Wake, supra note 167, at 19–20.
218
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
217
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A. Emotional Mechanisms
White people in this country will have quite enough to do in
learning how to accept and love themselves and each other,
and when they have achieved this—which will not be
tomorrow and may very well be never—the Negro problem
will no longer exist, for it will no longer be needed.
– James Baldwin219
What James Baldwin writes about racism in the epigraph casts a light on
the relevance of self-love and universal love in the problem of discrimination.
This is no less true of disability than of race. Indeed, the self-love piece may
be even more resonant in the context of disability, where we could all become
people with disabilities that we currently do not have—so disability bias may
be, in an even more direct sense, bias against ourselves.
Emotions toward others are also important here, and this Section begins
by examining mechanisms that involve compassion and feelings of
interconnectedness with others. The Section ends by considering some feeling
states that meditation may influence, for instance, by reducing stress or fear.
1. Emotions Toward Others: Increased Outward Compassion and
Openness
By identifying and creating personal, interpersonal and
systemic teachings and practices which increase and deepen
experiences of interconnection across lines of real and
perceived difference, Mindfulness-Based ColorInsight Practice
increases our actual capacities not only for acting in less
biased ways, but also for making more authentic, positive and
effective cross-race relationships in these re-segregated times.
– Rhonda Magee220
The emotions toward others that meditation may help to cultivate, which
could help reduce disability discrimination, encompass multiple elements.
As noted earlier, the distinctions drawn in this Part of the Article—between
emotional and cognitive or behavioral mechanisms, for instance—are in
many ways artificial. The epigraph from Rhonda Magee nicely displays that
point, since her understanding of how mindfulness can help to debias along
race lines brings together components of insight (cognitive), actions that are
less biased and relationship-building across race (behavioral), and authentic
and positive feelings of interconnectedness (emotional). This Section will
219

James Baldwin, Letter from a Region in My Mind, NEW YORKER (Nov. 10, 1962),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1962/11/17/letter-from-a-region-in-my-mind.
220
Magee, How Mindfulness Can Defeat Racial Bias, supra note 37.
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nonetheless emphasize and attempt to parse the outward-directed emotional
elements of how meditation could help with debiasing around disability.221
a) Feelings of interconnectedness. One possible emotional mechanism
is to increase feeling of interconnectedness through meditation. Many
mindfulness teachers talk about the emotional experience of connection that
can come through meditation.222 Ethan Nichtern contrasts the typical way
we go through our lives in Hobbesian terms—“scared, separate, and
selfish”—with the emotional orientation he suggests is possible through
meditation—of feeling “courageous, compassionate, and connected.”223
As discussed, disability discrimination is subject to a puzzling dynamic
whereby we could all become disabled at any time in ways we are not
currently, and yet this seems not to bring us together but to push us apart.224
Recognizing our interconnectedness, not just in an intellectual sense but in
a felt sense, could be an avenue to overcoming that dynamic.225 This might
help overcome the “Us” and “Them” that divides people across the lines of
stigma,226 fear,227 and “aesthetic anxiety.”228
The type of meditation that might first come to mind for increasing
feelings of interconnectedness, among those who study meditation, is
so-called lovingkindness meditation. This meditation is a concentration
practice in which the practitioner, rather than focusing on the breath or some
other anchor, focuses on a series of phrases of well-wishing to near or far
others, as well to oneself, and all people.229 And some research does support
the intuition that lovingkindness practice improves positivity toward neutral
strangers and enhances feelings of interpersonal connection.230 But there is
also research suggesting that the basic mindfulness meditation practice can
221

Freshman and colleagues draw a useful distinction between internal and external mindfulness.
See Freshman et al., supra note 37, at 286.
222
See, e.g., JON KABAT-ZINN, Interconnectedness, in WHEREVER YOU GO THERE YOU ARE:
MINDFULNESS MEDITATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE, at xv (10th anniversary ed. 2005); SHARON SALZBERG,
REAL LOVE 3–4 (2017) [hereinafter SALZBERG, REAL LOVE].
223
ETHAN NICHTERN, THE ROAD HOME: A CONTEMPORARY EXPLORATION OF THE BUDDHIST
PATH 183–90 (2015). On the Hobbes reference, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97 (Oxford 1909)
(1651) (classifying human life as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”).
224
See supra Section II.D.1.
225
Cf. Harris, supra note 29, at 940–41 (discussing the tendency in disability law to focus on
cognitive mechanisms and overlook the emotional and aesthetic dimensions that may constitute “sticky
norms”).
226
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
227
See supra Section II.A.1.
228
See supra Section II.A.2.
229
It takes many forms, and often involves all beings—thus including animals and perhaps plants—
but this is a general description of a basic practice. For discussion and sources, see supra note 70.
230
Cendri A. Hutcherson, Emma M. Seppala & James J. Gross, Loving-Kindness Meditation
Increases Social Connectedness, 8 EMOTION 720, 723 (2008) (finding that lovingkindness meditation
increases implicit and explicit positivity toward neutral strangers); Kang et al., supra note 71, at 1306
(citing Hutcherson et al., supra, and other studies).
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increase feelings of empathy or interconnectedness, even without any
specific instructions or phrases targeting affective affinities.231
b) Compassion. A related in-road is the cultivation of compassion. In
one striking study, described earlier, new practitioners of mindfulness
meditation were more than twice as likely as non-meditators to offer their
seat in a waiting room to a person apparently struggling on crutches.232
Empathy is often touted as a positive step toward intergroup relations,
but affective empathy—in the sense of feeling what the other person is
feeling—can have some downsides. For instance, over time, burnout can
accompany sharing the emotions of those in great distress; this can be an
occupational hazard for those in frontline jobs like firefighting, healthcare,
or human rights work.233 Research suggests that meditation can help to
cultivate compassion rather than empathy, enhancing a person’s ability to be
present for another person’s emotions without being overcome with feeling
them directly.234
The distinction between compassion and empathy is not simple to
understand or describe. It seems to lie in the difference between being fully
present to another person’s feelings with a desire to help (whether or not that
is possible), which is compassion, as opposed to feeling the other’s feelings,
which is empathy.235 Ricard, Lutz, and Davidson explain the distinction in
this way:
If a child is hospitalized, the presence of a loving mother at his
side holding his hand and comforting him with tender words
will no doubt do that child more good than the anxiety of a
mother overwhelmed with empathetic distress who, unable to
231
See, e.g., Paul Condon, Gaëlle Desbordes, Willa B. Miller & David DeSteno, Meditation
Increases Compassionate Responses to Suffering, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2125, 2127 (2013) (reporting on an
experimental study finding that “meditation directly enhanced compassionate responding” and those
“participants practicing mindfulness meditation were as likely to aid the sufferer as were those practicing
compassion meditation”).
232
See, e.g., Lim et al., supra note 100 (noting that 37% of meditating participants gave up their
seats compared to 16% of the passive control group).
233
See, e.g., Sarah Knuckey, Margaret Satterthwaite & Adam Brown, Trauma, Depression, and
Burnout in the Human Rights Field: Identifying Barriers and Pathways to Resilient Advocacy, 49
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 267, 279–88 (2018) (summarizing studies on PTSD and mental health issues
in people regularly exposed to trauma at work).
234
See, e.g., Ricard et al., supra note 106, at 44 (explaining that experienced lovingkindness
practitioners were better at sharing other peoples’ feelings without becoming subsumed or overwhelmed
by them); see also SALZBERG, REAL LOVE, supra note 222, at 214–17 (citing Tania Singer); Lim et al.,
supra note 100, at 6 (finding that regular meditation increased prosocial behavior without necessarily
increasing empathy).
235
See Ricard et al., supra note 106, at 44 (describing a study finding that subjects who practiced
meditation centered on compassion for a week experienced “more positive and benevolent feelings” in
response to “video clips showing suffering people,” whereas subjects who “devoted a week to an
experimental regimen that just cultivated empathy” also “experienced emotions that resonated deeply
with others’ sufferings” but in addition this group “experienced more distress, sometimes to the point of
not being able to control their emotions”).
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bear the sight of her sick child, paces back and forth in the
hallway. In the latter case, the mother may then end up with
the common experience of burnout, which, in one U.S. study,
beset about 60 percent of the 600 caregivers surveyed.236
The cultivation of the feeling of compassion may enable connections and
emotional presence even in the face of suffering or, as is sometimes the case
with disability, perceived suffering.237
2. Emotions Toward Oneself: Increased Compassion and Acceptance
In the course of my practice, my biggest lesson has been how
to open my heart and be aware of how I am feeling. I have
learned to allow my pain to be what it is, honor it, and be
gentle with myself and whatever faults I perceive. From that
place, my world—my capacity for compassion, gentleness and
clarity—has opened itself up before me.
– angel Kyodo williams238
I am larger, better than I thought,
I did not know I held so much goodness.
– Walt Whitman239
These lines from williams and Whitman assert the power and
significance of generosity toward oneself, of inward compassion and
acceptance. The earlier lines from James Baldwin, in the epigraph at the start
of this whole Section, make the leap from that power to the battle against
discrimination: In Baldwin’s words, the problem of discrimination against
African-Americans will end when “White people in this country . . . learn[]
how to accept and love themselves and each other.”240 Baldwin does not
suggest this will be easy or quick; rather he suggests that “White people . . .
will have quite enough to do” and that their “achieve[ment]” of this “will
not be tomorrow and may very well be never.”241 Self-love is not easy—and,
by extension, neither is love of one’s own kind—Baldwin tells us. And its
absence causes us to create hierarchies and put others down. Baldwin is
writing about race, but these points could be applied to the various status
236

Id. at 44.
See supra Section II.A.3.
238
WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 8.
239
Walt Whitman, Song of the Open Road, POETRY FOUND., https://www.poetryfoundation.org/
poems/48859/song-of-the-open-road (last visited Mar. 14, 2021); see also S HARON SALZBERG, THE
FORCE OF KINDNESS: CHANGE YOUR LIFE WITH LOVE & COMPASSION 15 (2005).
240
Baldwin, supra note 219.
241
Id.
237
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hierarchies we create as humans, including of nondisabled over disabled.
Another way that increasing self-compassion and self-acceptance could
help reduce discrimination would be by helping us to become more willing
to see our own biases. Mindfulness “allows one to focus on the present
moment: noticing thoughts, bodily sensations, and environmental cues in a
nonjudgmental and compassionate way,” which “is critical to managing
implicit bias as it increases contact with thoughts and sensations that are
often fleeting and unnoticed.”242 Becoming aware of one’s internal
experience can be aversive; knowing that you think thoughts or have feelings
that are discriminatory can feel terrible. Unless people have the emotional
resources to face those inner truths, they will have a hard time recognizing
the fact of discrimination. This is likely to be true for disability, which hits
close to home for most people,243 as well as for race.
These points taken together may be why one study finds that
mindfulness meditation paired with perspective-taking exercises—in which
younger people try to inhabit the perspective of an older person—more
effectively reduces old-age bias than perspective-taking alone.244 The
mindfulness may help a person live with the feeling of seeing the world—
and seeing themselves—through the other person’s eyes.
3. Feeling States: Decreased Stress, Anger, and Fear
Meditation could also reduce negative emotions that contribute to
negative attitudes or behavior toward people with disabilities. Stress, anger,
and fear are negative emotional states that may fuel discrimination and,
research suggests, can be reduced by mindfulness meditation.245
242

Jovonnie Esquierdo-Leal, Nicole Jacobs & Shanna Strauss, Prejudice in the Health Care System:
Remediation Strategies, in PREJUDICE, STIGMA, PRIVILEGE, AND OPPRESSION: A BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
HANDBOOK 337, 348 (2020) (“Moreover, the nonjudgmental treatment of these thoughts can promote
productive behavior (e.g., identifying how those thoughts came about and what can be done to ensure
they are not harmful) and reduce less productive behavior (avoidance and negative thought
suppression).”).
243
See Okoro et al., supra note 15 (citing statistics on the prevalence of disability).
244
Edwards et al., supra note 68, at 1619–20; see also Lillis & Hayes, supra note 66, at 406–07
(finding that an “acceptance” approach, emphasizing acceptance of one’s own difficult emotions, worked
better than traditional race-bias classroom training).
245
See, e.g., Gunes Sevinc, Britta K. Hölzel, Jonathan Greenberg, Tim Gard, Vincent Brunsch,
Javeria A. Hashmi, Mark Vangel, Scott P. Orr, Mohammed R. Milad & Sara W. Lazar, Strengthened
Hippocampal Circuits Underlie Enhanced Retrieval of Extinguished Fear Memories Following
Mindfulness Training, 86 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 693, 700 (2019) (citations omitted) (“The current
results, together with previously reported morphological differences between meditators and
nonmeditators, suggest hippocampal-dependent changes in contextual retrieval as one plausible
mechanism through which mindfulness-based interventions regulate affective response, foster stress
resilience, curtail susceptibility to anxiety, and improve emotion regulation, while also advocating a
novel way to enhance fear extinction.” (citations omitted)); Yi-Yuan Tang, Britta K. Hölzel & Michael
I. Posner, The Neuroscience of Mindfulness Meditation, 16 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 213, 218
(2015) (reporting, in a literature review, on findings of “various positive effects of mindfulness
meditation on emotional processing, such as a reduction in emotional interference by unpleasant stimuli,
decreased physiological reactivity and facilitated return to emotional baseline after response to a stressor
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Schimchowitz and Rohmer hypothesize that a more positive affect state
coupled with a present-moment orientation (discussed above under
cognitive mechanisms) could help reduce negative responses to disability.246
Specific negative emotions might also dovetail with particular responses to
disability, and thus their reduction could help in particular ways. For
instance, reduced stress might make room for more patience to notice
particular features of a person’s abilities and impairments—and thus
counteract the totalizing assessments associated with stereotypes and the
spread effect.247 Reduced fear might help ameliorate social distancing and
stigma, particularly for disabilities that suffer from stereotypes of
dangerousness, such as mental illness,248 or aesthetic-based fear
responses.249 And reductions in anger might help enable constructive
dialogue and interactions that build relationships. 250 This final point
connects to Section C on behavioral mechanisms, but first we turn to an
important set of cognitive mechanisms.
B. Cognitive Mechanisms
1. Clearer Seeing of Others: Increased Attention to Current Facts
Rather than Stereotypes or Past Frames
We are all in such pain, trying to do the right thing, trying not
to ask the wrong questions, trying to pretend everything is
okay. If we need anything in this world, it’s honest seeing and
film, and decreased self-reported difficulties in emotion regulation. Consequently, lowered intensity and
frequency of negative affect and improved positive mood states are reported to be associated with
mindfulness meditation. . . .” (citations omitted)); Kang et al., supra note 71, at 6 (“Previous research has
revealed that [Implicit Association Test] scores can be artificially elevated by stress and anxiety. Thus,
one way that practicing lovingkindness meditation might reduce implicit bias is by diminishing stress.
Indeed, decreases in stress mediated the effect of lovingkindness meditation on implicit bias toward the
homeless people.” (citations omitted)).
246
Schimchowitsch & Rohmer, supra note 77, at 646 (“[C]onsequently meditators could use affects
as heuristics to deal with the present moment. Then, the generalised positive affective disposition of
meditation practitioners could reduce the strength of past automatic association between disability and
negativity. In addition, recent neuroimaging research evidenced that meditation practitioners exhibit
significantly different neural responses in cognitive and affective brain circuitry than non-meditators.”
(citations omitted)).
247
Kang et al., supra note 71, at 196; see also Diana Burgess, Michelle van Ryn, John Dovidio &
Somnath Saha, Reducing Racial Bias Among Health Care Providers: Lessons from Social-Cognitive
Psychology, 22 SOCIETY OF GENERAL INTERNAL MEDICINE 882, 884 (2007) (arguing that “stress and
negative emotions may increase stereotyping” and “when time and circumstances allow, the use of
stress-reducing techniques to enhance emotional well-being before patient encounters may help reduce
racial bias”).
248
See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 208; David DeSteno, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Monica Y. Bartlett &
Aida Cajdric, Prejudice from Thin Air: The Effect of Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes, 15
PSYCH. SCI. 319, 323 (2004); Alkoby et al., supra note 73.
249
Harris, supra note 29; supra Section II.A.2.
250
See, e.g., DeSteno et al., supra note 248, at 323; Alkoby et al., supra note 73.
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speaking, and the ability to be with the actual truth (including
flawed bodies, and flawed responses). That, to me, is love, and
the heart of what meditative living is all about: realizing what
actually is instead of being caught up in and entranced by what
we think would be better.
– Joan Tollifson251
Meditation helps us to attend more accurately to what is happening in
the present moment.252 Rather than rapidly assimilating new information to
pre-existing categories or assumptions drawn from the past, the meditating
mind perceives a more nuanced present-moment reality. In more technical
terms, meditation has been found to “discontinue automatic inference
processing shown in priming and stereotyping”253 or at least “minimise the
impact of priming and the biased influence of past experience on thoughts
and behaviour.”254 Though no study has definitely proven that this
mechanism is driving debiasing,255 studies have found that mindfulness can
inhibit automatic evaluations in other contexts 256—for instance,
“mindfulness reduced dieters’ automatic responses to attractive food,
reduced problem solvers’ reliance on automatic solutions, and reduced the
correlation between implicit alcohol attitudes and drinking behavior.”257
For disability discrimination, enhanced awareness of the present could
mean the difference between viewing a disabled person through discrediting
stereotypes and viewing the person with realistic attention to her strengths
and limitations. In the words of Langer and colleagues,
If mindfulness became the more typical state, whereby the
“normal” person were typically seen mindfully, it would
prevent one characteristic from dominating the characterization
of the individual. As such, global characteristics such as
“disabled” could become more differentiated and may come to
be specific such as “a person who cannot do X.” Contextspecific competencies, and not only incompetencies, could
become more apparent. For example, if one mindfully
251

Tollifson, supra note 56, at 106.
See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Boost: Improving Mindfulness, Thinking, and Diversity, 10 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 139, 173–82 (2018) (explaining that mindfulness decreases cognitive biases and
improves decision-making); SALZBERG, supra note 70, at 11 (“Transformation comes from looking
deeply within, to a state that exists before fear and isolation arise.”); Ricard et al., supra note 106, at 42
(“[F]ocused-attention meditation … aims to tame and center the mind in the present moment while
developing the capacity to remain vigilant to distractions.”).
253
Schimchowitsch & Rohmer, supra note 77, at 646 (citation omitted).
254
Id. (citations omitted).
255
Lueke & Gibson interpret their results in this way, but as noted, the study has several limitations.
See supra note 65.
256
See Lueke & Gibson, supra note 67, at 284 (citation omitted).
257
Id. (citations omitted).
252
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considered (or considered at all) a noisy environment, one
would be more likely to realize that of several potential
workers, a worker who is deaf would probably be the better
job candidate. Similarly, if sitting for extended periods of time
were of consequence, one confined to a wheelchair may be a
more appropriate employee than one who needs to exercise his
or her limbs. Undifferentiated global distinctions now mask
these subtleties.258
Langer tendentiously refers to this as reducing prejudice by increasing
discrimination.259 Whether one finds the rhetoric useful (and Langer’s use
of the phrase “confined to a wheelchair” is itself problematic 260), the notion
that perceiving more accurate details rather than assimilating information to
preexisting categories speaks directly to some of the dynamics of disability
discrimination discussed in Part II.
For instance, attending to the nuances of an individual disabled person’s
reality, rather than a pre-existing category of “disabled person” or “blind
person,” should reduce the spread effect—both because outsiders would do
less generalizing from the category “disabled” and because they would see
more clearly the reality of what the person could do and not do. This
attention to present-moment reality should also facilitate a more accurate
perception of others’ suffering, whether it is greater or less than we might
otherwise imagine it would be.261 Moreover, seeing more clearly should also
make it more possible to perceive the benefits of accommodation and of
disability. The bias of perceiving disability through the lens of loss and cost
leads to inaccurate views of disabilities and disabled individuals. As noted
earlier, the cognitive and the affective are not so easily separated, and the
epigraph highlights their interconnectedness in this sphere.
2. Clearer Seeing of Oneself: Improved Awareness of One’s Own
Thoughts and Feelings
The practice of watching the mind—of seeing clearly the operations of

258

Langer et al., supra note 85, at 114.
Id. at 119.
260
Note that the phrase “confined to a wheelchair” is generally disfavored as inaccurate by disability
advocates, since wheelchair users do not stay in their wheelchairs constantly (contrary to the confinement
of prisoners) and wheelchairs tends to create possibilities of mobility (rather than confinement) for their
users. See, e.g., Karin Willison, Please Stop Saying “Wheelchair Bound,” FREE WHEELIN’ TRAVEL
BLOG, https://www.freewheelintravel.org/please-stop-saying-wheelchair-bound/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2021); People First–Ensuring Equal Access for People with Disabilities, 60 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 14
(2006) (“Use people first language: ‘he uses a wheelchair.’ Do not use ‘wheelchair bound,’ ‘confined to
a wheelchair’. Avoid negative or sensational descriptions of a person’s disability.”).
261
For a discussion of the kinds of disabilities for which outsiders tend to underestimate, as opposed
to overestimate, the associated suffering, see supra Section II.A.3.
259
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262

one’s own thoughts and feelings —can reveal the stereotypes and attitudes
that lurk within.263 Without appreciating our own biases, we can far too
easily assume that problems of bias belong to someone else or belong in the
past.264 Recognizing one’s own biases—the fact that the voice in one’s head
can be different than we might hope, to paraphrase Dan Harris265—may be
the first step to a willingness to make change at the individual, relational, or
structural levels,266 but, at the very least, such recognition makes it harder to
assert that such bias does not exist. Behavioral change may be more likely
if awareness is coupled with tools for managing the difficult emotions that
may accompany such awareness, which brings us to the next Section.
C. Behavioral Mechanisms
Between stimulus and response, there is a space. In that space
lies our freedom and our power to choose our response. In our
response lies our growth and our happiness.
– Attributed to Viktor Frankl267
The small body of empirical work finding meditation to have debiasing
effects reports an impact not only on stereotypes and attitudes, but also on

262

Perceiving one’s emotions could be understood as an emotional process or a cognitive process;
this is a fine example of the ways that the emotional and the cognitive are intertwined. This point is
included under cognitive mechanisms because the emphasis here is on the mental faculty of perceiving
thoughts as well as emotions; other Sections will discuss the experience of feeling emotions.
263
See Yoona Kang, June Gruber & Jeremy R. Gray, Mindfulness and De-Automatization, 5
EMOTION REV. 192, 194, 194–96 (2013) (explaining “[a]wareness is contrasted with automatized mental
reactions. . . . Implicit stereotyping, for example, is a phenomenon in which automatized reactions occur
outside of one’s awareness. . . . A mindful individual may be more likely to notice when implicit
stereotyping takes place, having accurate awareness of the nature of the bias. . . .”).
264
See, e.g., ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR WHITE PEOPLE TO
TALK ABOUT RACISM 3 (2018) (describing the author’s experiences of White people who “simplistically
reduced racism to a matter of nice people versus mean people” or who “appeared to believe that racism
ended in 1865 with the end of slavery”).
265
See supra text accompanying note 43.
266
See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Devon W. Carbado, Pamela Casey, Nilanjana
Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel D. Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin D. Levinson & Jennifer
Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1174 (2012) (“[L]earning about
nonconscious thought processes can lead people to be more skeptical about their own objectivity.”);
Patricia G. Devine, Patrick S. Forscher, Anthony J. Austin & William T.L. Cox, Long-Term Reduction
in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1267,
1270 (2012) (finding reductions in implicit bias through an intervention that included increasing
awareness of implicit bias as one mechanism).
267
This quotation is widely attributed to Frankl, author of Man’s Search for Meaning (1946), but
further investigation suggests it is probably not from him. See VIKTOR FRANKL INSTITUT, Alleged Quote,
https://www.univie.ac.at/logotherapy/quote_stimulus.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2022) (citing STEPHEN
R. COVEY, Foreword, in PRISONERS OF OUR THOUGHTS: VIKTOR FRANKL'S PRINCIPLES FOR
DISCOVERING MEANING IN LIFE AND WORK, at vi (2004)).
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behavior and behavioral correlates. This Section considers what mechanisms
might contribute to meditation’s debiasing through behavioral change.
1. Inserting a Pause: Reducing Reactive Speech and Actions
A news article about one of the first school-based mindfulness programs
reported on this definition of mindfulness from a young practitioner:
Mindfulness means “not hitting someone in the mouth.”268 This quotation,
coupled with the line attributed to Frankl in the epigraph, captures the idea
of mindfulness as reducing reactivity and increasing self-control.269 Rhonda
Magee refers to mindfulness practice as “Practicing ‘The Pause.’”270
The opportunity to pause before acting from instinct may present the
possibility of making decisions—at work and elsewhere—based more on
facts than stereotypes or negative attitudes about disability. This is a
behavioral outgrowth of increased capacity for emotional self-regulation.271
Another way of thinking about this is through the dual-process model of
cognition. On this model, slowing down helps support decisionmaking
through deliberative “System 2” cognition rather than the instinctive
“System 1.”272
In practice, more deliberative decision-making could mean noticing an
impulse not to choose a worker with a disability for a challenging
assignment and making a different choice. Or it could mean recognizing
selective sympathy in response to requests for flex time—and leveling the
playing field.273 Or it might mean realizing that the disability bias in your
own mind probably reflects a broader problem that requires structural
responses in the workplace or other institutions. 274

268

Patricia Leigh Brown, In the Classroom, a New Focus on Quieting the Mind, N.Y. TIMES (June
16, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/us/16mindful.html (quoting fifth grader, Tyran
Williams).
269
Magee, The Way of ColorInsight, supra note 37, at 274 (quoting JON KABAT-ZINN, FULL
CATASTROPHE LIVING: USING THE WISDOM OF YOUR BODY AND MIND TO FACE STRESS, PAIN, AND
ILLNESS 49–50 (1990)).
270
MAGEE, INNER WORK, supra note 37, at 16–17.
271
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
272
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011); see also Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 39–42 (2007) (describing ways that judicial systems can be reformed to help judges make more
deliberative decisions); Fogel, supra note 32, at 6 (offering his explanation of how mindfulness practice
may help judges).
273
Cf. supra note 205 and accompanying text (describing selective sympathy and indifference).
274
On structural solutions, see generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114
YALE L.J. 1 (2004). For a critique of the limits of structural insight through meditation alone, see infra
Section V.B.3.
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2. Instilling the Practice of Practice: Developing a Habit of
Beginning Again
The pause before action just described could lead to another step
forward. The practice of meditation is also, however, the practice of
beginning again. This means a willingness to start over, to go back to where
you were, and to do so again and again. This is what prompted news anchor
(and former war correspondent) Dan Harris to call meditation “a badass
endeavor” and “a rigorous brain exercise: rep after rep of trying to tame the
runaway train of the mind.”275 There is no one-time moment of enlightenment,
but instead a slow process of repeated effort. This fits the recurring process of
unlearning biased responses in general, and the particular work of
accommodation, which can involve an “interactive process” of multiple
conversations to find what works and then to adapt it with changing
circumstances of the impairment or of the workplace over time.276
3. Slowing Down: Making More Time to Absorb Details and Build
Relationships
The contemporary world makes it a badge of honor to be “busy,”277 and
empirical work suggests that rushing makes us less inclined to notice and
help others in need.278 Meditation is a practice of stillness, which may offer
a pathway to greater responsiveness to the facts of the present moment and
the needs of others.279 In the context of disability, this form of slowing down
may work together with the cognitive mechanisms described earlier to
facilitate noticing the competencies (as well as the needs) of a particular
individual with a disability or the benefits of accommodations under
consideration. It may also help to create the space for building relationships
in place of social distance across difference. More broadly, making more
room for stillness or slowing down may support greater acceptance of some

275

HARRIS, 10% HAPPIER, supra note 33, at 99–101.
On the interactive process, see infra Section IV.C.
277
See, e.g., BRIGID SCHULTE, OVERWHELMED: WORK, LOVE, AND PLAY WHEN NO ONE HAS THE
TIME 21–23 (2014); ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, THRIVE: THE THIRD METRIC TO REDEFINING SUCCESS AND
CREATING A LIFE OF WELL-BEING, WISDOM, AND WONDER 5–6 (2014); Erin Griffith, Why Are Young
People Pretending to Love Work, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/bu
siness/against-hustle-culture-rise-and-grind-tgim.html.
278
See, e.g., John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A Study of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 100,
104 (1973) (finding that subjects who were told they were running late were less likely to help a stranger
in distress along their route); C. Daniel Batson, Pamela J. Cochran, Marshall F. Biederman, James L.
Blosser, Maurice J. Ryan & Bruce Vogt, Failure to Help When in a Hurry: Callousness or Conflict?, 4
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 97, 99 (1978) (conducting a similar study with the added factor that
participants were told either that their presence was or was not vital to the person waiting and finding
that the subjects who were told their presence was “less important” to the person waiting were more
likely to offer help the distressed stranger).
279
See, e.g., Freshman et al., supra note 37.
276
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people with disabilities, namely those whose disabilities lead them to move
at a slower pace.280
4. Escaping the Talking Head: Increased Bodily Awareness
Mr. Duffy . . . lived at a little distance from his body.
– James Joyce, Dubliners281
This line from Joyce’s Dubliners captures a common feeling, not just of
a fictional character, but for many whose work centers on their mental
production:282 the feeling of being disembodied, like a “head on a stick,” as
one new meditator put it.283 Getting quiet to pay attention to what is
happening in the present moment often includes noticing what is happening
in the body—both because bodily sensations can be one anchor for
mindfulness, and because bodily sensations may be harder to ignore when
everything goes quiet and still. Paying attention to our own bodies and what
is happening in the moment may also mean noticing change in the body and
beginning to tap into physical vulnerability.
Matthew Sanford, who wrote a memoir about how his spinal cord injury
eventually led him to yoga and to understanding his body differently, uses
these words to compare his body’s decline with the normal process of aging:
This silence that I perceive within my body came upon me
abruptly through a spinal cord injury. For most people,
however, the process is slower. It develops through aging.
Over time, the body becomes slower to respond, more likely
to sit at rest, more content to observe rather than act.284
Seeing the connection between our not-yet-disabled bodies and a
currently disabled body may be a pathway into connection rather than
distance. This brings us to existential mechanisms.
D. Existential Mechanisms
Next we hear about a sculptor. A large, powerfully built man
who fabricates and welds metal, building huge and sometimes
280
Cf., e.g., SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON
DISABILITY 37–40 (Annette Junemann ed., 1996) (arguing that the “pace of life” today is a social factor
that contributes to the construction of disability).
281
JAMES JOYCE, DUBLINERS 134 (B.W. Huebsch, Inc. 1916).
282
Cognition-heavy work is just one reason a person might feel removed from their body; others
include, for example, past trauma or painful experiences. See, e.g., Bessel van der Kolk, THE BODY
KEEPS THE SCORE (2014).
283
SUSAN BÖGELS & KATHLEEN RESTIFO, MINDFUL PARENTING: A GUIDE FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PRACTITIONERS 312 (2014).
284
MATTHEW SANFORD, WAKING: A MEMOIR OF TRAUMA AND TRANSCENDENCE 60 (2006).
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towerlike structures. We find out that this sculptor lost his leg
some years ago, is unable to wear a prosthesis, and continues
to sculpt with one leg . . . . He has sculpted a sphere out of
stone, perhaps marble or granite. We are told that it was
perfect, with an uninterrupted, smoothly polished surface.
After the sphere was completed, the artist smashed it, then put
it back together with bolts, metal fasteners, and bonding
agents. Now—full of fractures—it is sitting in the middle of the
gallery, in the middle of America, labeled SHATTERED BUT
STILL WHOLE….
This is every person’s story.
– Saki Santorelli285
Disability implicates our human vulnerability, our ideas of physical and
mental perfection, and our sense of control over what happens to us. For
these reasons, our beliefs and understandings about life may affect our
attitudes to disability as well. This Section therefore offers several
mechanisms that might be called “existential,” though they also involve
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral elements.
1. Facing Our Own Vulnerability—and Everyone Else’s
We do not know exactly how or when we will die, but we do
know for certain that we will die. It really makes no sense,
then, to make death our enemy. We would only be fighting a
losing battle with the inevitable, diverting precious energy
away from the opportunities that await us in every moment of
the time that remains.
– Sharon Salzberg286
In the epigraph, the meditation teacher Sharon Salzberg invites her
readers to face the fact of their own eventual death. The aspect of meditation
that involves slowing down and simply facing the facts of reality—trying to
clear one’s mind to see reality as it arises—may involve confronting truths
that we commonly try to ignore.287 These include our changing bodies and
minds with age and our eventual death.288
As part of trying to avoid apprehending our own vulnerability, we may
wish to avoid witnessing other people’s vulnerability. We may wish to avoid
285

SANTORELLI, supra note 32, at 80–81 (1999) (referencing the work of artist Terry Karpowicz).
SHARON SALZBERG & ROBERT THURMAN, LOVE YOUR ENEMIES 121 (2013).
287
See, e.g., Namaste: Seeing the Truth of Who We Are, TARA BRACH (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.tarabrach.com/namaste-truth-who-we-are/.
288
Cf., e.g., Tollifson, supra note 56, at 106 (“Perhaps we fear disability because we fear death. We
fear imperfection, loss of control, disintegration.”).
286
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knowing or truly taking in someone else’s disability. This dynamic may
underpin the existential anxiety surrounding disability discussed earlier.289
We may also wish to avoid other people’s suffering, whether physical
or mental, because it reminds us of either our own current or past suffering—
or of the possibility of suffering we might face. Salzberg elsewhere writes:
“It is easy to turn suffering into the enemy. In the throes of emotional or
physical pain, we want to be anywhere but where we are, smack up against
our human condition. We tend to fight against suffering when it assails us,
which only brings more pain.”290 She links this point to our reactions to
others: “When suffering approaches us in other people’s lives, we may do
our best to avoid it. Though we have a natural impulse toward empathy and
a wish to behave benevolently toward those in need, this is sometimes harder
than it sounds.”291 This point intersects with the earlier discussion of how
often people get it wrong when they try to imagine the suffering of people
with unfamiliar disabilities or when they try to say the right thing: 292 “We
don’t always know how to relieve others’ suffering; often we can’t, in fact.
Then our only recourse is to be present and attend to the fact of the suffering,
which can be difficult.”293
Some would say that we keep busy in order to avoid facing these
realities. Meditation stops the cycle of busyness and can disrupt that
avoidance. Slowing down also may mean becoming more aware of the body,
as discussed in relation to behavioral mechanisms.294 That may contribute to
a different kind of embodied appreciation of the suffering that can
accompany being human, and thus a less guarded response to those who are
currently suffering—or whose current state makes us think that they have
suffered in the past. In the words of Jasmine Harris, there is “a collective
preference that emphatically denies vulnerability, mortality, and
uncertainty.”295 By giving people tools to become more at ease with their
own vulnerability and mortality and more “comfortable with uncertainty,”296
mindfulness may be able to help unstick these sticky norms and support the
realization of contact’s full benefits.

289

See supra Section II.D.
SALZBERG & THURMAN, supra note 286, at 43.
291
Id.
292
See supra Sections II.B.2 & II.C.2.
293
SALZBERG & THURMAN, supra note 286, at 43.
294
See supra Section III.C.
295
Harris, supra note 29, at 957.
296
Pema Chödrön has a book by this name. PEMA CHÖDRÖN, COMFORTABLE WITH UNCERTAINTY
(Emily Hilburn Sell ed., 2018).
290
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2. Not Knowing It All: Integrating Mistakes and Losses into an
Understanding of Life and Growth
Mr. Sai lost his horse. His neighbors say, “Poor Mr. Sai.”
Mr. Sai just says, “Could be good, could be bad; who knows?”
Then the horse comes back, leading another wild horse.
His neighbors rejoice for him, saying how lucky he is now that
he has two horses. He replies again, “Could be good, could
be bad; who knows?”
While riding one of the horses, his son falls off and
becomes permanently disabled, and again the same. The
villagers say, “Poor Mr. Sai.” And he says, “Could be good,
could be bad; who knows?”
Then the army comes to town, but the son cannot be
pressed into service because of his disability.
Could be good, could be bad. Who knows?
– Chinese parable297
This parable captures several ideas. The first is the observation that
sometimes things that look bad turn out to be good (and vice versa). The
second is the view that we typically do not have the perspective in the present
moment to assess the meaning or significance (or even the eventual valence)
of what is happening to us. This idea is captured more baldly in a passage
from a commencement address by the writer Mary Karr: “[A]lmost every
time I was super afraid it was of the wrong thing. And stuff that first looked
like the worst, most humiliating thing that could ever happen almost always
led me to something extraordinary and very fine.”298
It is not obvious how recognition of the possibilities of not knowing the
meaning of what is happening now stems from a practice of paying attention
to what is actually happening now. One way to understand this goes back to
the earlier discussion of our tendency toward automatic categorization—in
the examination of cognitive mechanisms299—and the way that
present-moment awareness may allow us to take in new facts about the
reality as they are, rather than simply assimilating new information to an
existing mental formation rooted in the past. Once this process of taking in
new information more slowly and clearly (through meditation) occurs again
and again, a person may begin to loosen the belief in the rightness of those
297

Chinese parable adapted from various retellings, see, e.g., ARTHUR H. SMITH, PROVERBS AND
COMMON SAYINGS FROM THE CHINESE, TOGETHER WITH MUCH RELATED AND UNRELATED MATTER
INTERSPERSED WITH OBSERVATIONS ON CHINESE THINGS-IN-GENERAL 92 (1914) (dating it to the “Sung
Dynasty,” tenth to thirteenth century). Since writing this Section, I discovered Joan Tollifson’s lovely
rendering of the parable. Tollifson, supra note 56, at 110.
298
Mary Karr, Commencement Address at Syracuse University (May 10, 2015).
299
See supra Section III.B.1.
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expectations, of those preexisting notions, including the expectations of
what is for the best and what is for the worst.
This may, in turn, help to undermine a certain perfectionism. If we
cannot know what the ideal is, or how things are going to turn out based on
our plans, then we may be more able to integrate mistakes into our
understanding of growth and a “good” life. This kind of good life, filled with
apparent mistakes that turn out to be opportunities, is a life that seems more
able to embrace the fact of disability and vulnerability to it—and the specter
of it represented by people currently living with disabilities.300 In the words
of Joan Tollifson, “Imperfection is the essence of being organic and alive.
Organic life is vulnerable; it inevitably ends in disintegration. This is part of
its beauty. True meditation delves into this mystery of life and death . . . .”301
Recognizing the beauty in imperfection may in turn help create greater ease
for nondisabled people in interactions with disabled people. This greater
ease with uncertainty and imperfection may also reduce stress, and thus feed
back in to the emotional mechanisms discussed earlier.302 More ease with
mistakes brings us to the final point.
3.

Showing Up for Life as an “Adventure” with Humor and Curiosity
The last story. The setting is an amusement park, a
carnival, or a street fair, I don’t remember which. A late
summer evening. . . .
In the midst of the merry-go-round, the arcade, and the
fun house, a round-faced little girl of four or five emerged from
the crowd. She let go of her mother’s hand and ran straight
over to me. Her big saucer eyes looked me up and down. She
took in a big swallow of the night air, raised up on her toes to

300

On the power of vulnerability, see, for example, Brené Brown, Embracing Vulnerability,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AO6n9HmG0qM. Cf. ROBERT MCRUER,
CRIP THEORY: CULTURAL SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND DISABILITY, at xv (2006) (explicitly “inverting”
the tradition in acknowledgements sections by humbly crediting others with any “defects” to the work
and accepting responsibility “for the moments when crip energies and ideas are contained or diluted in
what follows”).
301
Tollifson, supra note 56, at 106. As Tollifson has written, this approach to perfectionism and
imperfection may also be useful to disabled people: “I am grateful for this koan of one arm, even though
it is not always pleasant or easy. It teaches me to appreciate the miracle of what is, to feel affection for
my actual life. Cardboard ideals of perfection are flat and pale by comparison.” Id. at 112.
302
See, e.g., SHARON SALZBERG, REAL LOVE, supra note 222, at 66 (2017) (“Perfection is a brittle
state that generates a lot of anxiety, because achieving and maintaining unwavering standards—whether
they’re internal or external—means we’re always under threat. We become focused on avoiding failure,
and love for the self cannot be a refuge because it has become too conditional, too dependent on
performance.”).
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and

asked:

– Simi Linton303
These words from the writer Simi Linton, whose bright red power
wheelchair adorns the cover of her memoir, My Body Politic, portray a child
approaching disability with wide-eyed curiosity—even excitement. In
contemporary U.S. culture, as noted earlier, children typically learn that
asking questions about disability, or even talking about it, is embarrassing
and to be avoided.304 A message of shame may be conveyed to children
through these interactions, as various disabled scholars have written.305
The silencing of their questions seems to be the opposite of the gentle
curiosity that Adrienne Asch associates with “getting it” around disability.
In the epigraph to this Part of the Article, these words were used to describe
Asch’s view of what makes a nondisabled person a disability insider:306
Such a person has to be comfortable enough not knowing all
the answers and not being in control at all times. A person who
gets it responds to his own confusion or ignorance about the
ways of a disabled person by thinking, “I don’t actually know
how X is going to do Y, but I’ll take his word for it that he can
and see what happens.” A person who gets it, as Adrienne
portrayed him or her, is inclined to “see life as an adventure.”307
That comfort with lack of control and with the absence of total information,
coupled with curiosity about the present-moment facts, seems to represent
cognitive and emotional mechanisms that we have been discussing. But the
last sentence—viewing life “as an adventure”—brings us more fully into the
realm of the existential: How does a person view life, and what kind of life
does a person want to live?
The idea of “adventure” seems to encompass an openness to taking risks,
to making mistakes. One emotional component that might go along with
adventure, missing in the Asch account, is implied in the Linton excerpt: a
sense of humor, an ability to laugh even in challenging moments.
Disability is a realm in which no one has all the answers; no one is a
total insider. A blind person has no special knowledge about how to shake
303

LINTON, supra note 184, at 246.
See, e.g., Tiffiny Carlson, Disability Awareness: 10 Things Parents Should Teach Their Kids
about Disabilities, HUFFPOST (Aug. 2, 2013, 06:07 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/disabilityawareness-parents-teach-kids_n_3696279 (“From telling their child to always look away or giving them
a generic viewpoint of people with disabilities, mistakes on how to talk about [people with disabilities]
are abound.”).
305
See, e.g., id.; see also supra Section II.C.1.
306
Cf. Emens, Framing Disability, supra note 36, at 1386 (distinguishing an “inside” and an
“outside” view of disability).
307
Emens, What’s Left in Her Wake, supra note 167, at 20.
304
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hands with someone who has quadriplegia. So in a diverse community of
disabled people, mistakes are common, and everyone lives with that—and
even may find humor in that. 308 The genre of comedy internal to the
disability community, characterized by laughing with rather than laughing
at, has burgeoned in recent years, perhaps in part for that reason.309 This
offers an antidote to the silencing shame foisted upon children curious about
disability in mainstream culture, which shuts down the sense of humor and
sense of adventure.
Mindfulness might just have the capacity to recall some of the curiosity
and playfulness of childhood.310 The practice of paying attention to every
moment, of realizing and knowing intimately the ridiculous twists and turns
of our minds, may well lead a person to a kindly familiarity with one’s own
foibles. Meditation teachers indeed speak of “beginner’s mind,” of
approaching each new breath, and each new moment, with the curiosity and
openness of a child.311 Perhaps this tool can help with responding to
disability in new—or forgotten—ways.
E. Chart of Mechanisms and Dynamics of Discrimination
The dynamics of disability discrimination and the mechanisms by which
meditation could help with debiasing are complicated. No symmetrical fit
neatly governs their relationship. One reason is that some of the mechanisms
are likely to help with most, if not all, of the dynamics. For instance, greater
awareness of present-moment details—rather than assimilation of new
information to preconceived notions—seems like a promising tool for seeing
disabilities more accurately;312 for overcoming the spread effect, while also
appreciating commonalities among disabled people;313 for appreciating
benefits of accommodations and of disability that might be neglected due to
308
Cf. Halley Bondy, Why Haben Girma, a Deafblind Lawyer & Activist, Thinks Humor Is Such a
Valuable Tool, BUSTLE (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.bustle.com/p/why-haben-girma-a-deafblindlawyer-activist-thinks-humor-is-such-a-valuable-tool-18552417 (“‘A lot of nondisableds feel nervous,
uncomfortable, worried about saying the wrong thing,’ she says. ‘When I tell a joke, though, the resulting
laughter allows people to relax a bit.’”).
309
See, e.g., Zaineb Mohammed, Laughing with the Disabled, E. BAY EXPRESS (Sept. 11, 2013),
https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/laughing-with-the-disabled/ (describing a comedy troupe
composed of comedians with disabilities).
310
On the value of curiosity, see, e.g., Judson Brewer, Curiosity: Our Superpower for Everything
from Breaking Bad Habits to Discovering Life, DR. JUD (Sept. 24, 2019), https://drjud.com/curiositysuperpower; see also Elizabeth F. Emens, On Trust, Law, and Expecting the Worst, 133 HARV. L. REV.
1963, 1996–98 (2020).
311
See, e.g., Yvonne Rand, Cultivating Beginner’s Mind, TRICYCLE (Spr. 2003) (“I want to talk
about practices that are conducive to cultivating Beginner’s Mind—the mind fresh and awake to many
possibilities. . . . How can I be a beginner in each moment, even in those situations where I am doing
something that I have done many times before?”).
312
See supra Section III.B.1.
313
See supra Section III.B.1.
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stereotypes; and for noticing if attempts to say the right thing are
misfiring.315 As another example, enhanced feelings of interconnectedness
should help reduce fear316 and misperceptions of suffering,317 supporting
constructive dialogue about disability.318 More broadly, a pause that permits
the choice to respond rather than react, or learning a practice of beginning
again, could help with any of the dynamics.
The chart in Figure 1 nonetheless provides an overview of some of the
key relationships among them—highlighting two in particular for each
dynamic and grouping them according to the rubric of the primary
mechanism. Following the chart, we turn in Part IV to the relevance of
debiasing through meditation to law and policy.

314

See supra Section III.C.3.
See supra Section III.C.1.
316
See supra Section III.A.3.
317
See supra Section III.B.1.
318
See supra Section III.C.2.
315
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FIGURE 1 – Dynamics of Disability Discrimination and Meditation’s
Mechanisms of Debiasing319
Disability Discrimination
Dynamic
The Quandary of Fear,
Rational and Irrational
Misperceptions of
Suffering

Rubric

Meditation’s Corresponding Debiasing Mechanisms
• Reducing fear
• Learning to pause to enable a choice to respond
not react

Emotional

• Developing greater compassion for others’
suffering (which may reduce burnout
associated with affective empathy)
• Paying attention to present-moment reality and
nuance

Integrating People with
Disabilities Requires a
Practice of Seeing
Disability

• Increasing awareness of present-moment
realities over stereotypes
• Learning a practice of beginning again—
unlearning biased responses and developing an
unbiased understanding of disability

Tension Between the
“Spread Effect” and the
Failure to Recognize
Disability as a Category or
Class

• Increasing awareness of present-moment
realities over stereotypes
• Building a sense of interconnectedness

Cognitive

The Neglect of Benefits—
of Accommodation and of
Disability

• Increasing awareness of present-moment
realities over stereotypes
• Appreciating how “mistakes” or non-idealized
forms can have benefits

Legal and Social Demands
for Explicit Dialogue about
Disability Alongside a
Culture of Silencing

• Learning to pause to enable a choice to
respond not react
• Learning a practice of beginning again – using
facts and not stereotypes to make decisions

The Irony of Attempts to
Do Right by Disability

Existential Anxiety in the
Face of Universal
Vulnerability

Behavioral

Existential

• Developing self-compassion to tolerate one’s
own mistakes
• Learning a practice of beginning again—trying
again after mistakes or awkward moments
• Approaching life as an adventure and with
curiosity
• Developing self-compassion to enable facing
realities of one’s own and thus of other people’s
vulnerability or suffering

319
The dynamics listed in the first column are the eight named in Part II, grouped according to the
rubric in the second column. See supra Part II. The mechanisms in the third column are drawn from the
previous sections of this Part, see supra Sections III.A–D, and are matched to the rubric of the first
mechanism listed for each.
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IV. DOCTRINAL INTERSECTIONS
Why is it just wealthy people who can afford to go on a retreat
who have this? To me, this is a social justice issue.
– Congressman Tim Ryan320
The practice of meditation has been making its way into legal
institutions in recent years, both in this country and abroad, as documented
by other scholars.321 Individual judges report engaging in forms of
meditation—most prominently, Justice Breyer.322 More broadly, teaching
judges to meditate has become part of efforts to promote and support
diversity and institutional citizenship. 323 And teaching global lawmakers to
meditate has been part of efforts to “focus . . . awareness and increase
compassion” among leaders on the national and international stages.324 In
2017, senior Labour and Conservative UK parliamentarians hosted an
international summit on mindfulness, joined remotely by Congressman Tim
Ryan of Ohio, author of the book A Mindful Nation,325 quoted in the
epigraph. According to the coverage of that summit, Congressman Ryan
“has said meditation guides his response to Donald Trump, whose reactive
tweeting may seem to many as being the opposite of mindful.”326
While reducing anyone’s disability bias would be salutary, debiasing
those who create, interpret, and apply the law, if possible, seems especially
useful. Judges and prosecutors, as well as employers and administrators and
the lawyers who advise them, are among those who warrant a particular

320

DAN HARRIS, JEFF WARREN & CARLYE ADLER, MEDITATION FOR F IDGETY SKEPTICS: A 10%
HAPPIER HOW-TO BOOK 108 (2017).
321
See, e.g., Riskin, supra 114, at 3; Freshman et al., supra note 37, at 315; MAGEE, supra note 37,
at 5.
322
See Freshman et al., supra note 37, at 315 and accompanying text (describing Justice Breyer’s
meditation practice); see also, e.g., Fogel, supra note 32, at 4 (describing the benefits of judges engaging
in meditation).
323
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Chairman, 2021 Columbia Law School Access to Justice Conference:
Fighting Systemic Racism: Law School and Community Partnerships (June 2, 2021) (describing the use
of mindfulness to achieve greater justice in Massachusetts courts); see also Susan Sturm, Designing the
Architecture for Integrating Accommodation: An Institutionalist Commentary, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 11, 13 (2008) (discussing “institutional mindfulness”).
324
Robert Booth, ‘Way Ahead of the Curve’: UK Hosts First Summit on Mindful Politics,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2017, 9:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/oct/13/politician
s-meditate-commons-mindfulness-event (“British and Sri Lankan government ministers and an MP for
Israel’s Likud party are among politicians from 15 countries due to meditate together at the House of
Commons next week in an event to explore whether mindfulness can help reset the conduct of national
and international politics. . . . Since 2013, 145 UK parliamentarians have undertaken an eight-week
course in the practice.”).
325
RYAN, supra note 34.
326
Booth, supra note 324.
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focus.327 The bias of judges may seem inevitable,328 but the tool of
mindfulness holds some promise for debiasing judges as well as other actors.
This Part focuses on several doctrinal areas where greater mindfulness by
legal decisionmakers could help produce better outcomes.
A. Emotional: The Assessment of “Direct Threat” Under the ADA
Fear arguably plays a significant role in responses to disability by
employers as well as judges and other legal actors. Fears of dangerousness,
as some scholars have discussed, surrounds responses to psychiatric and
psychosocial disability;329 and, as I have written elsewhere, fear of emotional
contagion may underpin some of the doctrinal confusion surrounding these
forms of disability under the ADA.330 Physical disability also can provoke
fears, whether of literal contagion,331 lack of safety,332 or unfamiliar rules
and regimes.333
The ADA presents a legal framework for addressing fearful responses
to disability within the workplace setting. The statute provides that
“‘qualification standards’ may include a requirement that an individual shall
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace.”334 The direct threat analysis must be objective; an employer’s
good faith belief in an employee’s dangerousness will not suffice.335
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, courts at times end-run around this

327

See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 323; Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger, Scott R. Eliason,
Catherine R. Albiston & Virginia Mellema, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to
Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AMER. J. SOCIO. 888 (2011). Cf., e.g., Jasmine E. Harris,
Sexual Consent and Disability, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 480, 490 (2018) (“Does a person with a disability’s
decision to testify bias capacity determinations because factfinders cannot see beyond the existence of a
disability?”).
328
See, e.g., Jason D. Vendel, Note, General Bias and Administrative Law Judges: Is There a
Remedy for Social Security Disability Claimants, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 770 (2005) (arguing that
“few” Administrative Law Judges adjudicating social security disability claims “will deny that bias
inevitably seeps into their decisionmaking process”); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson,
Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1221-22 (2008-09) (finding, in an empirical study of implicit bias among judges, that
“most of the judges—white and black—showed a moderate-to-large degree of implicit bias in one
direction or the other” and “that implicit biases can translate into biased decisionmaking under certain
circumstances, but they do not do so consistently”).
329
See supra note 143.
330
Emens, Sympathetic Discriminator, supra note 128, at 470.
331
See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (rejecting a fear-based
approach to interpreting the ADA in response to fears of HIV contagion).
332
Emens, Sympathetic Discriminator, supra note 128, at 454.
333
See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 699–703, 705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
334
42 U.S.C. §§ 12113(b), 12111(3) (2009) (defining “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation”).
335
See, e.g., Ann Hubbard, Understanding and Implementing the ADA’s Direct Threat Defense, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 1279, 1336–45 (2001).
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objective inquiry, finding ways to defer to “common sense” fears rather than
requiring that objective analysis of risk.336
This example highlights how mindfulness might be useful. For instance,
mindfulness could lead to a direct reduction in the feeling state of fear.337 In
addition, mindfulness could help enhance a feeling of interconnectedness, to
replace “us” and “them” othering that leads to shortcutting the legal
framework. Finally, meditation could assist a legal interpreter with applying
cognitive focus to present-day facts rather than falling prey to pre-existing
stereotypes (which is also the mechanism at the heart of the next Section).
Each of these could help employers and courts apply the direct threat inquiry
in the objective manner that the law requires.
B. Cognitive: The Cost-Benefit Analysis of “Reasonable” Accommodation
Under the ADA, covered employers are required to make “reasonable
accommodations” for employees with disabilities, unless those
accommodations would impose an “undue hardship” for the employer.338
Key court decisions have interpreted “reasonable” to depend on some rough
comparison of costs and benefits.339 That analysis has often neglected a
whole category of the potential benefits of accommodation.340
Such analyses are far from systematic. Indeed, in the words of one
scholar, the framework for determining the reasonableness of
accommodations in the foundational case Vande Zande v. Wisconsin
consists of “cost-benefit balancing . . . without seriously analyzing either
costs or benefits.”341 The lack of rigor makes the neglect of benefits no less
significant. A loose comparison of costs and benefits may be shaped even
more by a missing category on one side of the ledger.
For instance, imagine that an employee wants to telecommute—an
accommodation the plaintiff sought in Vande Zande342—and the court
considers only the benefit to the plaintiff, the cost to the employee, and the
cost to any coworkers who might have to pick up the extra slack at work for
an employee working from home. Now imagine instead that the judge takes
into account the potential benefits to coworkers of the employer’s
336

See supra Section II.A.1.
See supra Section III.A.
338
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2009). The employment title of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ing]
against a qualified individual” with a disability because of the disability of such individual. Id. § 12112(a).
The ADA’s definition of disability raises many complicated issues, but these complications are not important
to my discussion here. Id. § 12102(1). To fail to accommodate a disability is to “discriminate,”
definitionally, under the ADA. See id. § 12112(b)-(b)(5)(A).
339
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995); Borkowski v. Valley Cent.
Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
340
See supra Section II.B.3.
341
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable
Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1895, 1896 (2007).
342
Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544 (describing the plaintiff’s request “to work full time at home”).
337
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experimenting with telecommuting and discovering associated advantages
to extending the policy to nondisabled employees. (This is not an unlikely
outcome, given the research on cost savings, improved morale, and other
benefits that may stem from telecommuting initiatives—and especially after
remote work arrangements became far more regular during the pandemic.343)
The individual employee’s request looks rather different—and more likely
to prevail—under this more complete cost-benefit accounting.
A cognitive corrective through mindfulness—to focus more on present
details than on stereotypes and assumptions formed in the past—could help
to broaden the frame and thus create a more accurate assessment of the
reasonableness of accommodations.344
C. Behavioral: The “Interactive Process” of Determining Accommodations
In light of the challenging dynamics of disability discrimination, the
legal demand that parties engage in an interactive process of dialogue about
disability accommodation in the workplace and children’s Individual
Education Programs at school is not a trivial requirement.345 This requires
individuals—workers with disabilities and their employers on the one hand,
parents and school administrators and other representatives on the other—to
speak explicitly about a subject that the culture pressures us to silence.346 To
be successful, these processes necessitate clear listening and speaking about
what may be heated matters. Such dialogue also involves complex problem
solving, often through repeated iterations of experimentation, information
gathering, and redesign.347
343
For studies of telecommuting, see, for example, Kristen M. Ludgate, Note, Telecommuting and
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Is Working at Home a Reasonable Accommodation?, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 1309, 1321–22 (1997). But cf. Michelle A. Travis, Telecommuting: The Escher Stairway of
Work/Family Conflict, 55 ME. L. REV. 261, 265–66 (2002) (describing some of the downsides of
telecommuting for women). For more recent analysis, in light of the large-scale experiment with remote
work during the COVID-19 pandemic, see for example, Arlene S. Kanter, Remote Work and the Future
of Disability Accommodations, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap
ers.cfm?abstract_id=3895798.
344
See supra Section III.B.1.
345
See supra Section II.C (citing provisions).
346
See supra Section II.C.
347
See, e.g., Seth D. Harris, Disabilities Accommodations, Transaction Costs, and Mediation:
Evidence from the EEOC’s Mediation Program, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5–10 (2008) (discussing
particular challenges in mediating negotiations over accommodations, including “a wider gap between
the parties’ expectations regarding the negotiation's results,” employer “bias[] against accommodation
claims,” “particularly significant” degrees of “bilateral asymmetric information” requiring gathering and
divulging sensitive information on both sides, and the “vastly . . . complex undertaking” of “finding an
effective and efficient accommodation”); Lizz Schumer, How to Disclose a Disability to Your Employer
(and Whether You Should), N.Y. T IMES (July 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/smarterliving/disclose-disability-work-employer-rights.html (providing advice on how to discuss disability and
accommodation with an employer, highlighting the importance of “preparation” and “communication,”
and “recommend[ing] thinking creatively to come up with solutions that will carry minimal or no cost”).
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The elements of meditation described herein could assist with these
challenging processes. For instance, these practices could help the actors
involved in such dialogue to notice with curiosity the present-moment facts
about the other person and the situation; to pause before reacting and
respond more thoughtfully; to recognize and have compassion for their own
biases; to have access to some feeling of interconnectedness; to get past fear;
to take risks in designing creative solutions; and to accept mistakes as part
of the process and begin again (and again and again).348
D. Existential: The Global View of the ADA as Special Rights for “Them”
or Universal Insurance for “Us All”
For all actors who interpret or apply the ADA, overcoming existential
anxiety and replacing it with a keener sense of shared human vulnerability
would seem a helpful corrective to the commonly stigmatizing reaction to
disability.349 The backlash against the original ADA seemed a reaction to the
far-reaching rights granted by the law, which defied the common sense of
disability understood on an individual medical model.350 Increasing not only
the feeling of interconnectedness, but the existential understanding of lives
worth living, might well help to avoid future backlash.351
***
This Part concludes with a point drawn from contract law. Under the
light shed by this Article, we can now see that the doctrine of “impossibility”
in contract law resonates with Harlan Hahn’s conception of existential
anxiety. The excuse of impossibility of performance is traditionally
permitted to a contracting party when death or disability interferes with
performance.352 The implication of the doctrine is that no one should have
anticipated the death or disability of a central actor to the contract.353
348

See supra Part III.
See supra Section III.D.
350
See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
351
On the ongoing challenges to courts in interpreting the ADA, see supra notes 21–22 and
accompanying text.
352
See, e.g., Taylor v. Caldwell (1863), 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 314; 3 B. & S. 827, 838–39 (“The
principle seems to us to be that, in contracts in which the performance depends on the continued existence
of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the
perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performance.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS.
§ 262 (1981) (“Death or Incapacity of Person Necessary for Performance: If the existence of a particular
person is necessary for the performance of a duty, his death or such incapacity as makes performance
impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made.”); U.C.C. § 2-615 (1951) (“Delay in delivery or non-delivery . . . is not a breach of his duty under
a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made . . . .”).
353
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 261 cmt. a (1981) (“Even though a party, in
assuming a duty, has not qualified the language of his undertaking, a court may relieve him of that duty
if performance has unexpectedly become impracticable as a result of a supervening event. . . .
traditionally [including] . . . supervening death or incapacity of a person necessary for performance”);
349
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This elegantly captures the ways that individuals, and the legal system
that surrounds us, steel ourselves against the knowledge of our own
vulnerability: Death and disability are so remote from our minds that we do
not even need to think about them; we can be excused from failing to foresee
them and allocate the risk of their occurrence in an arms’ length commercial
contract. An inquiry into debiasing through meditation invites us to ask what
the world might look like, were we instead to face the fact of our eventual
death, as well as those disabilities that we will eventually acquire, beyond
any we may currently have, if we are lucky enough to live that long.
V. CRITIQUES AND LIMITS
My friends, especially those who are interested in helping the
world, say things like “So, remind me: how does sitting on
your ass help anybody, exactly?” From the outside, meditation
can seem mystical, indulgent, and weird.
– Ethan Nichtern354
This Part briefly addresses key critiques of this Article’s argument that
mindfulness meditation might have some role to play in debiasing disability
discrimination. As discussed earlier, the empirical studies supporting a link
between meditation and debiasing disability discrimination are thus far still
small, few, and limited in power, which is why this Article merely uses them
as a starting point for asking why such a link might exist and what it would
mean if so.355 This Part discusses several other critiques of the arguments
offered throughout.
A. In Principle
1. Meditation Is Politically Quiescent
As seen in the epigraph, some regard meditation as politically quiescent.
Under this view, enlisting meditation in the work of social change is contrary
to engaging in a practice organized around the idea of just being.
But alongside these stereotypes—which sometimes do have a basis in
reality356—there exist important traditions and teachers who are deeply

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 261 cmt. b (1981) (noting that “application is simple enough in
the cases of the death of a person or destruction of a specific thing necessary for performance. The
continued existence of the person or thing (the non-occurrence of the death of destruction) is ordinarily
a basic assumption on which the contract was made . . .”).
354
ETHAN NICHTERN, ONE CITY: A DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE 60 (2007).
355
See supra Part I.
356
Books in the mindfulness world do include titles like Don’t Just Do Something, Sit There.
SYLVIA BOORSTEIN, DON’T JUST DO SOMETHING, SIT THERE: A MINDFULNESS RETREAT (1996).
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engaged with the social and political realities of the world. In these
traditions, the practice of clear seeing is foundational to recognizing
inequalities and injustices in the world and taking skillful actions in
response.358 For these teachers, compassion for others’ suffering is a
motivation for action; and compassion also serves as a tool for resilience and
persistence in the fact of frustration, disappointment, and error. For example,
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. nominated the Vietnamese meditation teacher
Thich Nhat Hanh for the Nobel Peace Prize for “offer[ing] a way out of th[e]
nightmare [of war], a solution acceptable to rational leaders.”359 In King’s
words, Hanh “has traveled the world, counseling statesmen, religious
leaders, scholars and writers, and enlisting their support. His ideas for peace,
if applied, would build a monument to ecumenism, to world brotherhood,
to humanity.” 360
2. Meditation Is a Religious Practice
The epigraph also gets at the concern that mindfulness meditation is a
religious practice—and a weird one at that. This is part of the reason for Dan
Harris’s concern that mindfulness has “a towering PR problem.” 361
Western mindfulness meditation practices have roots in Buddhist
teachings.362 But a meaningful tradition of secular teachings in mindfulness
and other forms of meditation has developed—and been subject to empirical
study along many dimensions.363 This Article focuses on the empirical work
related to disability discrimination, among other forms of discrimination,
which is small, but there is a vast field of empirical studies of mindfulness
357
See, e.g., Thich Nhat Hanh, The Fourteen Precepts of Engaged Buddhism, LION ’ S ROAR
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.lionsroar.com/the-fourteen-precepts-of-engaged-buddhism/; SHARON
SALZBERG, REAL CHANGE: MINDFULNESS TO HEAL OURSELVES AND THE WORLD 20 (2020) (“In the face
of struggles for social justice, for making the world a better place even when the times feel daunting,
mindfulness and lovingkindness practice can help provide us with the tools we need to navigate the
emotional and conceptual terrain that comes with seeking to make change.”); Engaged Spirituality, TARA
BRACH, https://www.tarabrach.com/engaged-spirituality/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2022) (urging an
“[e]ngaged spirituality” involving “the active engagement of our heart and awareness in service of the
greater, collective good” and collecting resources on the subject); Tara Brach, Dharma for Times of
Global Trauma, LION’S ROAR (Mar. 24, 2022), https://www.lionsroar.com/dharma-for-times-of-globaltrauma/; NICHTERN, supra note 354, at 60.
358
See, e.g., id. (“Do not avoid contact with suffering or close your eyes before suffering. . . . Do
not accumulate wealth while millions are hungry. . . . Do not live with a vocation that is harmful to
humans and nature. Do not invest in companies that deprive others of their chance to live.”); NICHTERN,
supra note 354, at 60.
359
Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to the Nobel Inst. (Jan. 25, 1967), http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/45a/025.html.
360
Id.
361
HARRIS, 10% HAPPIER, supra note 33, at xiv.
362
See, e.g., Jane F. Compson, Is Mindfulness Secular or Religious, and Does It Matter?, in
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO ETHICS AND MINDFULNESS-BASED INTERVENTIONS 23, 23–43 (Lynette M.
Monteiro, Jane F. Compson & Frank Musten eds., 2017).
363
See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, WAKING UP: A GUIDE TO SPIRITUALITY WITHOUT RELIGION 1–15 (2014);
supra Section I.B.3.
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meditation more generally.364 The work of Jon Kabat-Zinn, mentioned
earlier, who founded the Center for Mindfulness at the University of
Massachusetts Medical Center, was a starting point for much of this
research.365
After his words quoted just above, Dan Harris goes on to say that
mindfulness’s “PR problem” arises “largely because its most prominent
proponents talk as if they have a perpetual pan flute accompaniment.”366 He
proposes this alternative: “If you can get past the cultural baggage, though,
what you’ll find is that meditation is simply exercise for your brain.”367
While this flattens out the history and context for mindfulness practice⎯a
choice debated among mindfulness teachers368⎯Harris here taps into an
important thread in the Western development of mindfulness meditation as
a secular practice.
3. Meditation Is Thought Control
Some might object to trying to change attitudes and behavior in response
to disability through meditation as objectionable “thought control.” These
concerns are not unique to the context of debiasing through mindfulness
offerings. This type of critique has been lodged at antidiscrimination laws
and efforts more generally, which may attempt a culture change to alter
implicit or explicit bias as well as discriminatory actions.369 Thorough
treatment of this issue may be found elsewhere, but several points are worth
noting briefly. First, the government frequently attempts to change people’s
minds, in routine ways, anytime it provides information—for instance,
nutritional information or labeling on foods.370 Second, some debiasing is
simply correcting mistaken factual impressions about other people; this idea
is embedded in the very concept of debiasing.371 Third, mindfulness
programs cannot be mandatory, even if they try to be, since it is not possible
to make people meditate.372

364

See supra Section I.A.
See, e.g., Jon Kabat-Zinn, Some Reflections on the Origins of MBSR, Skillful Means, and the
Trouble with Maps, 12 CONTEMP. BUDDHISM 281, 283–86, 294 (2011).
366
HARRIS, 10% HAPPIER, supra note 33, at xiv.
367
Id.
368
See, e.g., Ron Purser & David Loy, Beyond McMindfulness, HUFFPOST (Aug. 31, 2013),
www.huffingtonpost.com/ron-purser/beyond-mcmindfulness_b_3519289.html]; Tricycle Talks: On
McMindfulness, TRICYCLE (July 30, 2019), https://tricycle.org/podcast/mcmindfulness/.
369
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 992–94.
370
Id. at 992.
371
Id. at 993.
372
Nonetheless, programs that offer mindfulness in institutional settings, such as workplaces or
schools, should aspire to make sure that meditation offerings feel voluntary as well. See Emens, Law’s
Contributions to Mindfulness, supra note 111.
365
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B. In Practice
1.

Meditation as a Tool Will Backfire Because of Resistance

Telling people that meditation will help reduce bias may give interested
individuals one more reason to meditate, but that additional utilitarian
element could backfire. For some, an attractive feature of mindfulness
meditation for people is the idea of a space free of striving—a place to “just
be.”373 Piling on reasons or potential benefits, including benefits to others,
could backfire for some people.374 And for some subset of people, debiasing
may not sound like a benefit; they may want to keep their biases.
There is no complete solution to this concern. That some people will be
turned off by the hope of debiasing through meditation, should the evidence
build and become known, may be an unavoidable cost. Other people will
presumably find the prospect of debiasing salutary, particularly people for
whom their own implicit biases run contrary to their explicit views and
values.375 In addition, for people who find taking action to care for
themselves difficult because they value caring for others more highly, the
prospect that meditation could do both may be particularly attractive.376
Lastly, explicit reminders of these practices as a voluntary choice may help
to subdue the resistance.377
2. Meditation Will Make People Happier and Therefore More
Solipsistic
Some work suggests that increasing happiness can lead people to be
more biased, to make less refined distinctions.378 If meditation makes people
happier, then we might worry it will lead them to be more biased rather than
less.379 In addition, we might worry that the orientation toward the self will
lead to selfishness.380 Interestingly, though, some research finds that only
373

See, e.g., HARRIS, WARREN & ADLER, supra note 320, at 148–53.
Cf., e.g., Freshman et al., supra note 37, at 300–01 (citing research finding that yoga had fewer
benefits when advertised through explicit reference to its utilitarian benefits).
375
Cf. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 994 (proposing that “some people engage in biased behavior
inadvertently or despite their own ideals. Such people want, in a sense, to be debiased . . . . Many
normative objections to debiasing strategies . . . are weakened to the extent that such strategies help
people to remove implicit bias that they themselves reject on principle”).
376
See, e.g., F. Diane Barth, Self-Care Is Important: Why Is It So Hard to Practice?, PSYCH. TODAY
(May 13, 2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/blog/the-couch/201905/self-care-is-importantwhy-is-it-so-hard-practice.
377
See Emens, Law’s Contributions to the Mindfulness Revolution, supra note 111.
378
See, e.g., Jaihyun Park & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Mood and Heuristics: The Influence of Happy
and Sad States on Sensitivity and Bias in Stereotyping, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1005, 1017–
19 (2000) (finding that experimentally induced happy moods led to increased grouped-based
stereotyping, but sad moods did not).
379
Id.
380
See, e.g., john a. powell, “Healing Across Divides: Building Bridges to Challenge Systemic
Injustice,” Keynote Address, Bioneers 2020 Conference, https://bioneers.org/john-a-powell-creatingconditions-belonging-breathing-toxic-environment-zstf2101/ (observing that “some practice involving
374
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some happy emotions increase bias (such as anticipatory enthusiasm and
amusement) while other happy emotions (such as awe and nurturant love)
tend to decrease bias,381 and the latter forms of happiness might seem more
likely responses to meditation. More research is needed, however:382 to
understand which positive emotions lead to more, rather than less, bias; to
understand the mechanisms involved; and to clarify the potential
connections to meditation.
In the meantime, it is important to recognize that the primary form of
meditation presented in this Article⎯mindfulness meditation⎯is not the
same thing as positive thinking.383 Indeed, these practices of mindfulness—
of paying attention to whatever is happening right now without judgment—
aspire to clear seeing. And sometimes what one sees, inside or out, is painful
or unhappy. That is a part of these practices, and it is why, as discussed
earlier, meditation is compatible with social action rather than quietism for
many people. Moreover, combatting disability discrimination requires more
accurate perceptions and more comfort with reality,384 both of which are
aims of mindfulness practice.
3. The Voluntary and Individual Orientation of Mindfulness Makes It
Inadequate to the Task of Structural Change
The critique of mindfulness as inadequate to the task of structural change
is apt.385 The argument of this Article is, however, that mindfulness meditation
is one additional tool in the arsenal, not that it can solve the problem. In
mindfulness [is] critical in order to heal ourselves and heal each other, but I also want to push us to go
beyond that, because what we found at the Institute is that while people gravitate towards bridging and
belonging, they tend to do it in such a way that it becomes a very individualized practice”).
381
See, e.g., Vladas Griskevicius, Michelle N. Shiota & Samantha L. Neufeld, Influence of Different
Positive Emotions on Persuasion Processing: A Functional Evolutionary Approach, 10 EMOTION 190,
203 (2010) (finding that “the positive emotions of anticipatory enthusiasm, amusement, and to a lesser
degree attachment love appeared to enhance heuristic processing” whereas “when individuals were in an
emotional state of awe (e.g., seeing a breathtaking panorama for the first time) or of nurturant love (e.g.,
seeing a cute, vulnerable child), they were less persuaded by weak arguments than were people in an
emotionally neutral state”).
382
Id. at 303–04.
383
JON KABAT-ZINN, WHEREVER YOU GO, THERE YOU ARE: MINDFULNESS MEDITATION IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 93–95 (rev. ed. 2005).
384
Cf. Emens, What’s Left in Her Wake, supra note 167, at 20 (describing Adrienne Asch’s
preference for talking about increasing “accurate attitudes” or “comfortable attitudes” to disability rather
than “positive attitudes”).
385
Note that this critique particularly applies to the Western secular mindfulness tradition, rather
than to the tradition of community-based meditation with a deep ethical grounding. For more on this,
see, for example, Purser & Loy, supra note 368 (“But mindfulness, as understood and practiced within
the Buddhist tradition, is not merely an ethically-neutral technique for reducing stress and improving
concentration. Rather, mindfulness is a distinct quality of attention that is dependent upon and
influenced by many other factors: the nature of our thoughts, speech and actions; our way of making a
living; and our efforts to avoid unwholesome and unskillful behaviors, while developing those that are
conducive to wise action, social harmony, and compassion.”); supra Section V.A.1.
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particular, the individual orientation of meditation may be particularly
ill-equipped to illuminate people as to structural bias—though it may open
them up to reality and thus make them more open to learning about this. But
something else is likely needed here, which is a topic for another day.386
CONCLUSION
It is hard to have hope. It is harder as you grow old,
for hope must not depend on feeling good . . .
and hope is harder when it cannot come by prediction
any more than by wishing. But stop dithering.
The young ask the old to hope. What will you tell them?
Tell them at least what you say to yourself.
– Wendell Berry, “A Poem on Hope”387
[When white people ask, “Where can we find our hope?”], I
think what people want is, “Tell us that we’re going to get past
this.” . . . “Tell us it’s going to be OK.” . . . But there’s a
different kind of hope. There are people in the world who
accept that their life ends in death, and that’s bad, but that’s
what’s gonna happen. And then within that, they find joys and
hopes in between . . . .
– Ta-Nehisi Coates388
All hands-on deck, the saying goes, for great obstacles and for
challenging times. Disability discrimination in the present moment presents
a great obstacle and faces a challenging time. We therefore need every tool
that might serve the work toward change.
The focus in this Article has been on disability, which has some
distinctive features. But one final aspiration of this study is that closely
examining the impact mindfulness may have on disability may lead us to
further insights about other protected classes. As one example, the Article
has been discussing the clear need to pay attention to the protected
classification (disability) and to the surrounding social environment in order
to tackle disability discrimination and enable accommodation. As another
example, the Article has identified the importance of developing a practice
of taking steps to remediate the problem, to begin again, over and over, in
this domain.
Do we not also need these approaches in the realm of race discrimination
386

Emens, Law’s Contributions to Mindfulness, supra note 111.
WENDELL BERRY, LEAVINGS: POEMS 91 (2010).
388
Interview by Krista Tippett with Ta-Nehisi Coates, ON BEING (Nov. 16, 2017), https://onbei
ng.org/programs/ta-nehisi-coates-imagining-a-new-america/.
387
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or gender discrimination? Looking closely at the problem, being willing to
discuss it and to examine the surrounding social environment, to engage in
this practice of awareness again and again: these are promising strategies for
working toward race and gender justice, as others have discussed,389 among
other areas. These strategies sound more promising than imagining or
expecting some flash of insight and deliverance into a race/gender-free and
bias-free enlightenment—and certainly more promising than believing we
are already there.390
Following Wendell Berry in the epigraph, may we share the news of
whatever we tell ourselves about what works or might work, about what
holds out some promise for the future. May we have aspirations rooted in
facts and awareness of this moment, for all its obstacles and all its
possibilities. May we develop some clear-sighted reasons for collective hope
in challenging times.

389

See, e.g., ANNELIESE A. SINGH, THE RACIAL HEALING HANDBOOK 2 (2019) (discussing “healing
from racism” as “a process of proactive individual actions and strategies you can practice throughout
your lifetime” including “learn[ing] to recognize the wounds that racism creates in you, whether you are
White or a person of color” and “open[ing] your eyes to the costs of racism, which are pretty much
everywhere”); DERALD WING SUE, RACE TALK AND THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: UNDERSTANDING
AND FACILITATING DIFFICULT DIALOGUES ON RACE 5–6 (2015) (discussing, inter alia, the importance
of “race talk” and the challenges involved in engaging in it successfully); see also Rebecca M. Price,
Starting Conversations about Discrimination against Women in STEM, COURSESOURCE, https://qubes
hub.org/community/groups/coursesource/publications?id=2686&tab_active=about&v=1 (last visited
Mar. 29, 2021) (encouraging individual reflection, group discussion, and collective brainstorming to
problem solve case studies about gender discrimination).
390
Cf., e.g., DIANGELO, supra note 264, at 9 (“White progressives can be the most difficult for
people of color because, to the degree that we think we have arrived, we will put our energy into making
sure that others see us as having arrived. None of our energy will go into what we need to be doing for
the rest of our lives: engaging in ongoing self-awareness, continuing education, relationship building,
and actual antiracist practice. White progressives do indeed uphold and perpetrate racism, but our
defensiveness and certitude make it virtually impossible to explain to us how we do so.”).

